Brum v Town of Dartmouth and the Public Duty Rule: Navigating an Interpretive Quagmire by Barry, Kevin M
Boston College Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 2 Number 2 Article 4
3-1-2000
Brum v Town of Dartmouth and the Public Duty
Rule: Navigating an Interpretive Quagmire
Kevin M. Barry
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Torts Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kevin M. Barry, Brum v Town of Dartmouth and the Public Duty Rule: Navigating an Interpretive
Quagmire, 41 B.C.L. Rev. 383 (2000), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol41/iss2/4
BRUM V TOWN OF DARTMOUTH AND THE
PUBLIC DUTY RULE: NAVIGATING AN
INTERPRETIVE QUAGMIRE
Abstract: In 1993, a group of youths entered the Dartmouth High School
and stabbed sixteen-year old Jason Robinson to death in his social studies
classroom. In 1999, in BrUM v. Town of Dartmouth, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that the town was immune from suit pursuant
to Massachusetts' statutory "public duty rule," which insulates public em-
ployers from liability where the employer does not "originally cause" the
harm. This Article traces the evolution of public tort liability in Massachu-
setts, suggests a three-part framework for interpreting Massachusetts' public
duty rule and proposes a narrowly-tailored exception to the rule in cases like
Brunt.
INTRODUCTION
"Nice, huh?" a state police detective said [that] afternoon. "You send
your kid to school and he gets killed in homeroom."'
Dartmouth, Massachusetts is a small town nestled along the rug-
ged coast of southeastern Massachusetts, composed of neat homes
with weather-worn shingles and manicured lawns dotting its water-
front. 2 On Monday, April 12, 1993, Dartmouth, which had grown well-
accustomed to the constant and familiar battery of its shores by the
cold waters of the Atlantic, was newly rocked by the unfamiliar and
formidable tide of violence. 3 At approximately 8:30 a.m., a group of
youths entered Dartmouth High School wielding knives, a billy club, a
baseball bat and a length of pipe, and stabbed sixteen-year old Jason
Robinson to death in his social studies classroom. 4
On that day, the people of Dartmouth picked up the newspaper
and read the headlines; they turned on the TV and heard the news;
they called their neighbors and spoke with their coworkers and
Mike Barnicle, Death Comes to First Period, BOSTON GLOBE, April 13, 1993, at 21. Jason
Robinson was actually stabbed in his social studies classroom. See Brum v Town of Dart-
mouth, 690 N.E.2d 844, 846 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998), revel, 704 N.E.2d 1147 (Mass. 1999).
2 See id.
3 See Brum, 690 N.E.2d at 846.
4 See id. at 847.
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awaited the return of their sons and daughters, all Of whom tried to
explain the day's events. The people of Dartmouth thought about the
young man, Jason Robinson, and of their town. "How could this hap-
pen here?"
On that day, the school teachers—who had been teaching at
Dartmouth High School for ten and twenty and thirty years, who had
witnessed their fair share of fisticuffs among students and who had
perhaps briefly glimpsed the attackers parading through the hallways
that they knew so well—listened to each other's stories detailing the
terrible commotion that had taken place. The school teachers at
Dartmouth High School thought about the 'young student, Jason
Robinson, and about their workplace. "How could this happen here?"
On that day, the students—who saw the young man falter after
sustaining what looked like a mere punch to the stomach, who helped
the young man to his feet in an attempt to bring him to the nurse's
office and who shook their heads in disbelief upon hearing of the
student's death that afternoon—wrote messages in memoriam on
large banners draping the school's walls, while stepping over the fo-
rensic markings covering the school's floors. The students at Dart-
mouth High School thought about their peel; Jason Robinson, and
about their school. "How could this happen here?"
Following her son's death, Jason Robinson's mother sued the
town of Dartmouth and several school officials for negligence pursu-
ant to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act ("MTCA"), which makes
public employers liable for the torts of their employees. 5 The plaintiff
argued that the school officials had breached an affirmative duty to
protect her son from harm and that the school officials' employer, the
town of Dartmouth, should be held liable for his death. 6 According to
the plaintiff, the school officials failed to implement adequate security
measures as required by state law, and furthermore, when school
officials were explicitly forewarned of the attackers' arrival at the
school, the school officials failed to prevent them from entering the
5 See id.; Brief/Appendix for Appellant at 52a, Brum v. Town of Dartmouth, 690
N.E.2d 844 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (No. 96-P-687). The plaintiff also sued the town pu•su-
ant to the section 2 of the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Statute, MASS. Gist. LAWS. ch.
229, § 2 (1998), sections 11H and 111 of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. GE N.
LAWS. ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I (1998), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the state's violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See id. at 847,851-52. Although
these chums raise provocative and important issues concerning schools' duty to protect
students, they are beyond the scope of this Article.
6 See Brief/Appendix for Appellant at 5-6, Brunt (No. 96•P-68'7).
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school and proceeding into the social studies classroom.? If the school
"had taken adequate safety measures," the plaintiff argued, "the de-
ceased's attackers could not have entered the high school, and the
murder would never have taken place in the classroom."8
In 1995, the Massachusetts Superior Court granted a motion to
dismiss on grounds that the school was immune from liability under
the MTCA because the school's failure to adopt security measures was
a discretionary function immunized under chapter 258, section 10(b)
of the General Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
("§ 10(b)"), and because the school's failure to act fell within the
statutory public duty rule under chapter 258, section 10(j) of the
General Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts ("§ 10(j) "). 8 In
7 See id. at 3, 5-6. The Massachusetts law mandating the implementation of security
measures in public schools is chapter 71, section 3711 of the General Laws of the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts. See MASS. Gran. Laws ch. 71, § 37H (1998); Brum, 690 N.E.2d
at 851 n.11. Section 37H provides in relevant part that: 'The superintendent of every
school district shall publish the district's policies pertaining to the conduct of teachers and
students.... Each school district's policies . . . shall include ... standards and procedures
to assure school building security of students and school personnel" MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
71, § 37H.
8 See id. at 6.
9 See MASS. G. LAWS ch. 258, §§10(b), 10(j) (1998); Brum, 690 N.E.2d at 846-47.
Section 10(b) states:
[The provisions of sections one to eight of the MTCA shall not apply to] any
claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a public employer or
public employee, acting within the scope of his office or employment,
whether or not the discretion involved is abused.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch, 258, § 10(b). Section 10(j) states, in relevant part:
[The provisions of sections one to eight of the MTCA shall not apply to] any
claim based on an act or failure to act to prevent or diminish the harmful
consequences of a condition or situation, including the violent or tortious
conduct of a third person, which is not originally caused by the public em-
ployer or any other person acting on behalf of the public employer This ex-
clusion shall not apply to:
(1) any claim based upon explicit and specific assurances of safety or assis-
tance, beyond general representations that investigation or assistance will be
or has been 'undertaken, made to the direct victim or a member of his family
or household by a public employee, provided that the injury resulted in part
from reliance on those assurances. A permit, certificate or report of findings
of an investigation or inspection shall not constitute such assurances of safety
or assistance; and
(2) any claim based upon the intervention of a public employee which causes
injury to the victim or places the victim in a worse position than he was in be-
fore the intervention; and
(3) any claim based on negligent maintenance of public property; [and]
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1998, in Brunt v. Town of Dartmouth ("Brum 1"), the Massachusetts Ap-
peals Court reversed the superior court's decision and held the town
of Dartmouth liable for the school's failure to institute security meas-
ures and failure to respond to a foreseeable threat of harm. 1° In 1999,
however, in Brunt v. Town of Dartmouth ("Brum II"), the Supreme Judi-
cial Court reversed the appeals court and held that the school and
school officials were immune from suit. 11
This Article traces the evolution of Massachusetts public duty ju-
risprudence from its common law origins to its present-day
codification in Massachusetts law, with particular focus on the Su-
preme Judicial Court's decision in Brum H.12 Because the history of
public tort liability is based upon judicial precedent as well as state
statutory law, Part I of this Article reviews the evolution of public tort
liability in Massachusetts prior to 1994, in light of both the Supreme
Judicial Court's and the Legislature's attempts to expand and limit
public tort liability. 15 Examination of this push-and-pull pattern in-
cludes the court's abrogation of the sovereign immunity doctrine, the
Legislature's establishment of public tort liability through the MTCA,
the court's adoption of the common law public duty rule that limited
public tort liability and the Legislature's codification of the public
duty rule in 1994, in § 10(j). 14
Part II of this Article discusses the Supreme Judicial Court's ap-
plication of § 10(j) in recent decisions. 15 Due to the relative newness
of the provision and the dearth of Supreme Judicial Court case law,
Part II also examines a relevant Massachusetts Appeals Court decision
to supplement the Supreme Judicial Court's interpretations of
§ 10(j). 16 Part III of this Article charts the history of Brum v. Town of
Dartmouth from its genesis in the Bristol Superior Court of Massachu-
setts in 1995, to the Massachusetts Appeals Court in 1998, and finally,
to the Supreme Judicial Court in 1999. 17
(4) any claim based or on behalf of a patient for negligent medical or other
therapeutic treatment received by the patient from a public employee.
Mass. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(j).
1° See Brain, 690 N.E.2d at 846-47.
See Brum v. Town of Darunouth, 704 N.E.2d 1147,1155 (Mass. 1999).
12 See id. at 1152-55; see also infra notes 22-274 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 22-177 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 22-1'77 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 178-204 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 205-74 and accompanying text.
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Part IV of this Article analyzes the plain language of § 10(j) and
suggests a new three-part framework for interpreting the provision in
harmony with both its plain language and with existing public duty
jurisprudence. 1° This Article then uses this framework to explore the
weaknesses inherent in the Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of
§ 10(j) in Brum 11. 19 Finally, this Article explores the fine distinctions
drawn by a correct interpretation of § 10(j) by proposing several by-
potheticals and their likely resolutions under the provision. 20 In light
of the harsh results of these distinctions, as demonstrated by Bi-um II,
this Article suggests a new exception to public tort immunity for a
public employer's actual notice of a risk of harm and deliberate indif-
ference toward that risk of harm.21
I. THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC TORT LIABILITY IN MASSACHUSETTS,
PRIOR TO SECTION 10(I)
Massachusetts, like most other states in the United States, im-
poses no affirmative duty of protection on its public schools through
state statutory or constitutional directives.22 In fact, state statutory law
and its incorporation of traditional tort principles has made Massa-
chusetts public schools and school districts largely immune to tort ac-
tions.°
t° See infra notes 275-356 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 357-442 and accompanying text.
2° See infra notes 443-63 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 464=503 and accompanying text.
22 See MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 258, § 10( j) (1998), Because of the lack of an affirmative
duty to protect students and to provide safe schools under state statutory law, many plain-
tiffs bring claims against public schools tinder federal constitutional and statutory law.
Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that any person "who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State," deprives
another person of some existing federal right, is liable to the injured party. Those advocat-
ing an affirmative duty of protection for public schools under § 1983 most often invoke
the Due Process Clause, which courts have recognized as extending to parties who are
deprived of the "right" to be free from physical or sexual abuse in school. This Article fo-
cuses on the duty of Massachusetts public schools to protect students; the federal duty to
protect students is beyond its scope. For further discussion of the federal duty of public
schools to protect students, see generally Deborah Austen' Golsen, Safe Enough to Learn:
Placing an Affirmative Duty of Protection on Public Schools Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 30
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169 (1995); Stephen Faberman, The Lessons of Deshaney: Special
Relationships, Schools & the Fifth Circuit, 35 B.C. L. REV. 97 (1993); Michael Gilbert, Cont-
inent, Keeping the Door Open: A Middle Ground on the Question of Affirmative Duty in the Public
Schools, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 471 (1993).
22 See Mass. Grasr. LAWS ch. 258, § IOU).
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A. The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act: Abrogating Sovereign Immunity
At common law, an individual could not sue the government in
tort.24 This "sovereign immunity" from suit came to the United States
from England, where "the King could do no wrong" because there was
no court above him and thus, no court could enforce a claim against
him.25 When the Declaration of Independence was signed, most
American states adopted English common law, with the result that the
federal government, the states and all of their agencies were immune
from tort actions.26 Although municipalities are not sovereign agen-
cies of the government, but rather are corporations chartered by the
sovereign, they are, nevertheless, traditionally accorded immunity
from tort liability under common law.27
In 1977, the Supreme judicial Court joined a growing number of
states that had abolished or limited the sovereign immunity of states
and municipalities in tort actions. 28 In Whitney v. Worcester, the court
held that it intended to abolish the sovereign immunity doctrine, and
therefore, the city of Worcester and its public school officials were not
immune from suit by a student who was permaneiuly blinded after
being struck by a detective door at school. 29 In Whitney, a school
official directed a first-grade student, who was totally blind in one eye
and had limited vision in the other eye, to proceed to afternoon re-
24 See DAN B. DOBBS 84 PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL Ac-
COUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 387 (Sd ed. 1997).
23 See id.; Mark Valkenburgh, Note, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 258, S 10: Slouch-
ing Toward Sovereign Immunity, 29 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (1995).
26 See DOBBS 8c HAYDEN, supra note 24, at 387.
27 See id. Despite the substantial immunity of municipalities at common law, immunity
was precluded where the public employee was voluntarily engaged in conduct that was
"commercial in nature" (and insofar as the employee's conduct constituted misfeasance),
as opposed to conduct that was "for the common good of all without the element of spe-
cial corporate benefit or pecuniary profit." Whitney v. City of Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 1210,
1214-15, 1217 (1977) (quoting Bolster v. Lawrence, 114 N.E. 722, 724 (1917)); see also Amy
Beth Novit, Comment, Tort Law—Abrogating the Massachusetts Public Duty Rule—Jean W u
Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 496, 610 N.E.2d 303 (1993), 27 SurFoui U. L. REV. 986, 987-88,
996 n.16.
" See DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 24, at 388. In 1929, New York because the first state
to waive its sovereign immunity, and in 1945, in Bernadine u City of New York, this waiver was
interpreted to extend to New York's municipalities as well. See DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra
note 24, at 388 (discussing Bernadine v. City of New York, 62 N.E.2d 604 (N.Y. 1945)). By
the 1960s and 1970s, many courts and legislatures followed New York's lead by abolishing
or limiting the immunity of states and municipalities. See id. Today, most states have en-
acted statutes abrogating sovereign immunity, thus allowing at least some state or munici-
pal liability for torts committed by public employees acting within the scope of their em-
ployment. See id.; Valkenbsu-gh, supra note 25, at 1082-83.
29 See Whitney, 366 N.E.2d at 1212, 1218.
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cess itt the school yard, which required the student to pass through a
defective door without assistance. 30 When the door struck and injured
the student, school officials directed the student to remain in the
classroom, thus preventing the student from obtaining medical help
that could have prevented total blindness."
The court acknowledged that under the state's sovereign immu-
nity doctrine, both the city and its school officials were protected from
liability for their failure to prevent injury by neglecting to accompany
the student to recess and by neglecting to seek immediate medical
attention after the injury.52 Noting that Massachusetts was one of only
five remaining states that retained the sovereign immunity doctrine at
both the state and local levels, the court decided that "the time for
change [was] long overdue."33 The court thus stated its intention to
abolish sovereign immunity prospectively and erected in its place a
new set of criteria under which public employers and employees
could be held liable. 54 Under a "discretionary-ministerial distinction,"
the court reasoned that public employees should not be immune
from liability for conduct that rested upon the exercise of judgment
and discretion, but that they should be immune from liability for
conduct that represented the implementation and execution of gov-
ernmental planning and policy-making. 33 In light of its abrogation of
the sovereign immunity doctrine and its proposed "discretionary-
ministerial" analysis, the court concluded that the school officials, and
consequently the city, were not immune from liability because their
failure to take appropriate action constituted ministerial conduct. 36
" See id. at 1218.
Sr see id,
32 See id. at 1218-19.
ss Id. at 1213.
34 See Whitney, 366 N.E.2c1 at 1212, 1216.
38 See id. at 1216. "For example," the court stated, "a governmental entity is not liable
for negligence in the planning of sewers but may be liable for negligence in their con-
struction and maintenance." Id. This "discretionary-ministerial" distinction, the court
added, was consistent with the law of at least eighteen other states, and effectively pro-
tected public employees from liability for conduct involving a high degree of discretion
and judgment, while holding them to the same standard of liability as private parties for
ministerial conduct involving the carrying out of previously established policies or plans.
See id. By applying this discretionary-ministerial distinction to the "acts and omissions" of
public employers, moreover, the court abandoned the traditional misfeasance-nonfeasance
distinction that subjected public employers to liability "only when they have engaged in
overt and actively tortious conduct in ministerial matters." Id. at 1217 (emphasis added).
36 See id. at 1219, The court restricted its decision to the threshold determination of
whether the city and school officials were inunune from liability, not whether their conduct
was in fact negligent. See id. at 121911.12.
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Under pressure from the court, the Massachusetts Legislature
enacted the MTCA. 37 Modeled after the Federal Tort Claims Act, the
MTCA provides that public employers, including the state, cities,
towns and other public entities, are liable for the negligent acts and
omissions of their employees "in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances."38 By establish-
ing standards for bringing suit against public employers for tortious
injuries, the Legislature virtually eliminated the traditional distinction
between public and private eznployers. 38 In so doing, the Legislature
removed public employers' sovereign immunity defense.+ 3
 Moreover,
by including the "act or omission" language in the statute, the Legisla-
ture also eliminated the common law distinction between misfeasance
and nonfeasance, thereby expanding public employers' liability by
enabling suits to be brought against public employers for their em-
ployees' failure to act.41
57 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 1-13; Valkenburgh, supra note 25, at 1092. The
MTCA revised chapter 258 of the General Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
See Joseph W. Glannon, The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act: Analysis and Update, 75 MAss. L
REV. 52, 69 n.2 (1990).
38
 Mass. GEN. Laws ch. 258, § 2 (1998).
39 See Glannon, supra note 37, at 58.
4° See id.; Novit, supra note 27, at 996 11.18.
41 See MAss. GEN. Laws ch. 258, § 2; Giannon, supra note 37, at 58. At COIDID011 law,
one party owes another no duty to take affirmative action for the other's protection. See
Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (holding that defendant had no duty to res-
cue drowning plaintiff despite fact that defendant urged plaintiff to jump into water);
DOBBS HAYDEN, supra note 24, at 418-20. Indeed, although there is liability for misfea-
sance, which refers to "negligence in doing something active," and the improper doing of
an act which a person might lawfully do," there is no liability for nonfeasance, which refers
to the complete failure to act in the first instance. See Whitney, 366 N.E,2d at 1217 (quoting
Truro v. Paxton, 109 N.E.2d 116, 118, 119 (Mass. 1952)); DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 24,
at 418; Steven H. Gifis, Law Dictionary 297 (2d ed. 1984). Thus, under the general rule,
and provided that sovereign immunity has been abolished in the respective jurisdiction,
public employers are liable for their employees' misfeasance, but not for nonfeasance
(under the MTCA, of course, public employers are liable for both). See MASS. GEN. Laws
ch. 258, § 2.
There is, however, an exception to the general rule that imposes a duty of affirmative
action upon one party to protect the other, when the two share a "special relationship." See
DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 24, at 424-25. With respect to public school officials' duty or
lack of duty to public school students (with whom public school officials likely share a
"special relationship"), in many jurisdictions, including Massachusetts, the common law
"public duty rule" or a statutory version of the rule immunizes public employers from
school officials' failure to act to prevent harm—thus explicitly rejecting an affirmative duty
of public schools to protect their students. See infra note 57.
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B. Limiting Liability; The MTCA's Exceptions
While opening doors of potential liability through the MTCA, the
Massachusetts Legislature simultaneously closed others by attaching
several important exceptions to the MTCA that limited public em-
ployers' liability.° Specifically, § 10(a) of the MTCA excludes claims
based upon acts or omissions of public employees where such em-
ployees have demonstrated due care in executing state or local laws,
regardless of the laws' validity.° Closely paralleling a provision in the
Federal Tort Claims Act, the § 10(a) exclusion likely stems from a ju-
dicial desire to immunize uniquely "public" functiong prescribed by
law, irrespective of the wisdom of the underlying statute or regula-
tion.44 Moreover, by exempting from liability claims based upon pub-
lic employees' acts or omissions involving the exercise of "due care,"
the Legislature disposes of frivolous suits that would likely fail under a
traditional negligence analysis.°
In addition, § 10(b) of the MTCA provides that immunity for dis-
cretionary functions—traditionally enjoyed by public employers and
public employees at common law—should be protected by excluding
claims arising from the exercise of or failure to exercise a discretion-
ary function, whether or not the discretion involved was abused.' The
underlying reasoning for this exception, according to the Supreme
Judicial Court in Whitney, was the belief that the judiciary's ability to
review the reasonableness of legislative and executive branch policy
• decisions undermined the separation of powers. 41 In addition, the
court determined that the discretionary activities of public employees
were fundamentally different from conduct regularly performed by
privately-employed individuals and therefore deserved distinct treat-
ment under the law.` Thus, because judicial inquiry into such discre-
tionary activities "might impede governmental operations by subject-
ing governmental decision-making to after-the-fact judicial tort
42 See Mass. GEN. Lams ch. 258, §§ 10(a)-10(c) (1998). Another important "limita-
don" on liability under the MTCA was the limiting of damages awards to $100,000 per
plaintiff. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2.
42 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(a) (1998).
44
 See id.; see alsolVlatney, 366 N.E.2d at 1216; Joseph W. Glannon, Governmental Tort Li-
ability under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act of 1978,71 MASS. L. REV. 7,11 & n.65 (1981).
45 See Dinsky v. Town of Framingham, 438 N.E.2d 51, 53 (Mass. 1982).
48 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(b); Glannon, supra note 37, at 59.
47 See Whitney, 366 N.E.2d at 1217; Valkenburgh, supra note 25, at 1084.
48 See Whitney, 366 N.E.2d at 1216; Valkenburgh, supra note 25. at 1084.
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analysis" and the threat of potential legal liability, the court concluded
that these decisions should be insulated from such review. 49
Finally, under § 10(c), the MTCA also excludes claims arising out
of the intentional torts of public employees. 5° Patterned after the Su-
preme Judicial Court's consistent holdings favoring immunity for
public employers in intentional tort cases, § 10(c) also reflects com-
mon law considerations of vicarious liability and proximate cause. 51
Indeed, because employees' intentional torts are, in general, inde-
pendently motivated and beyond the control of public employers,
they necessarily fall outside of the above-mentioned common law doc-
trines establishing liability.52
 Thus, the Legislature likely intended
§ 10(c) to prevent public employers from bearing the costs of such
unforeseeable actions that occur outside of the scope of employ-
ment.53
C. Dinsky v. Town of Framingham and the Public Duty Rule: Further
Limiting the Liability of Public Employers
With the passage of the MTCA and the resulting abrogation of
sovereign hmnunity, the Supreme Judicial Court needed to determine
the extent to which public employers would be liable for negligence
in broad public oversight functions—"public duties" imposed by the
Legislature upon public officials "for the common good."54 Despite
the protections against liability already afforded to public employers
by the MTCA under §§ 10(a), 10(b) and 10(c), the court was con-
49 Whitney, 366 N.E.2d at 1215. Currently, the test for determining whether an act or
omission is discretionary, and thus foreclosed by the discretionary exception under
§10(b), involves a two-step analysis articulated by the Supreme Judicial Court in Harry
Stoller Co' Co., Inc. tt City of Lowell. See 587 N.E.2d 780, 782-83 (Mass. 1992). First, the court
must decide "whether the governmental actor had any discretion at all as to what course of
conduct to follow," as prescribed by statute, regulation, established agency practice, or by
some other readily ascertainable standard. Id. at 783. If conduct is not so prescribed, the
second level of inquiry requires a determination of whether the actor's discretionary con-
duct involved policy-making or planning—acts which are immune from suit. See id. at 782-
83; see also Valkenburgh, supra note 25, at 1085-86.
50 See Mass. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(c) (1998). Consistent with the common law, pub-
lic employees remain personally liable for their intentional torts. See Glannon, supra note 37,
at 65.
51 See DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 24, at 223-26, 546, 559-60; Glannon, supra note 37,
at 58, 65.
52 See Gannon, supra note 37, at 58, 65.
53 See DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 24, at 546.
" Whitney, 366 N.E.2d at 1214; see Dinshy, 438 N.E.2d at 56; Joseph W. Glannon, Liabil-
ity for "Public Duties" Under the Tort Claims Act: The Legislature Reconsiders the Public Duty Rule,
79 ntss. L. REV. 17,17 (1994).
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cerned that governmental inspection and licensing procedures, as
well as police and fire protection, would become the target of numer-
ous negligence suits that would cripple public employers' ability to
provide those needed services.55 In 1982, in Dimity v. Town of
Framingham, the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the "public duty"
issue for the first time in the context of a public employer's alleged
negligent inspection of a home. 56 The Dinsky court held that under
the MTCA, plaintiffs must prove the usual elements of a negligence
claim to recover damages, and that under the common law "public
duty rule," public employers are not liable for breach of a duty to
make inspections because inspection is a duty owed to the general pub-
lic rather than to specific individuals."
In Dinsky, after their one family residence was severely flooded,
the plaintiffs sued the town of Framingham for negligently failing to
inspect the lot prior to construction and issuing building and occu-
pancy permits in violation of grading and drainage requirements. 58
ss SevDinsky, 438 N.E.2d at 56; Clannon, supra note 54, at 17.
66 See Dinsky, 438 N.E.2d at 53-56.
57 See id. at 53, 55-56. The public duty rule was first recognized in 1855 in South v.
Maryland, where the Supreme Court held, "[i] t is an undisputed principle of the common
law, that for breach of a public duty, an officer is punishable by indictment . . . . It is a public
duty, for neglect of which lie (the public employee) is amenable to the public, and pun-
ishable by indictment only." Valkenburgh. supra note 25, at 1108 n.63 (quoting South v.
Maryland, 59 U.S. 396, 402-03 (1855)). Widely cited as authority for the public duty doc-
trine, COOLEY ON TORTS states:
The rule of official responsibility, then, appears to be this: That if the duty
which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a
failure to perform it, or au inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a
public, not an individual injury, and must be redressed, if at all, In some form
of public prosecution. On the other hand, if the duty is a duty to the individ-
ual, then neglecting to perform it, or to perform it properly, is an individual
wrong, and may support an individual action for damages. The failure of a
public officer to perform a public duty can constitute an individual wrong
only when sonic person can show that in the public duty was involved also a
duty to himself as an individual, and that he has suffered a special and pecu-
lia• injury by reason of its nonperformance.
DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 24, at 404-05 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON
TORTS § 300, at 385-86 (D. Avery Haggard ed., 4th ed. 1932)); seeValkenburgh, supra note
25, at 1108 n.64. Justice O'Connor of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has
defended the "traditional public duty rule" in multiple opinions, citing the rule's
reflection of current social values as well as its promotion of sound public policy, in addi-
tion to the rule's adoption by an "overwhelming majority" of courts. See Jean W. s: COM..
monwealth, 610 N.E.2d 305, 317-18 & n.1 (Mass. 1993) (O'Connor. J., concurring); Cyran
v. Town of Ware, 597 N.E.2d 1352, 1358 (Mass. 1992) (O'Connor. J., concurring); Al. v.
Commonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017, 1028 (Mass. 1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
" See Dinsky, at 51-52.
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Although the state building code imposed a statutory duty on the
State to inspect new lots, the court reasoned that this duty was owed to
the public at large and was not intended to furnish individual prop-
erty owners with a private cause of action. 59 Thus, because the public
employer owed no "duty" to the homeowners in the first place, the
court reasoned that there was necessarily no breach or causation to
trigger liability.69 The court determined that absent a special duty
owed to the plaintiffs as members of a particular class of persons un-
der the statute—a statutory intent exception to the public duty rule—
no cause of action could be maintained. 61 Furthermore, the court
noted that a contrary decision would deter municipalities from enact-
ing new regulations for the public good out of fear of increased liabil-
ity." Joining other jurisdictions in its adoption of the common law
public duty rule, the court concluded that the town was not liable for
negligent inspection because inspection was a public duty and not a
duty owed to specific individuals.65
Despite the Supreme Judicial Court's attempt in Dinsky to restrict
the application of the public duty rule to negligent governmental in-
spections, the court since has extended the public duty rule to other
cases involving a wide range of public protective services.64 For exam-
ple, between 1982 and 1993, the court denied liability for failure to
enforce the housing code, failure to provide adequate police protec-
tion, failure to follow proper gun permitting procedures and failure
to revoke an automobile registration.65 There were some exceptions,
" See id. at 55.
6° See id. at 56.
61 See Dinsky, 438 N.E.2d at 56. The "statutory intent" exception, Justice O'Connor ex-
plains, is a well-established exception to the public duty rule, which provides that where a
statute contains language expressly identifying particular classes of individuals as intended
beneficiaries, those individuals are owed a special duty of protection—the violation of
which will support a private cause of action. See, e.g., Jean W, 610 N.E.2d at 317 (O'Connor,
J., concurring); Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1357 (O'Connor, J., concurring); A.L., 521 N.E.2d at
1028-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Because the plaintiffs in Dinsky could not show that
individual property owners like themselves were expressly protected from negligent home
inspections under the state building code, they could not establish a statutory intent ex-
ception to the public duty rule. See 438 N.E.2d at 56.
" See id.
See id. at 55-56.
64 See Jean W, 610 N.E.2d at 310 (Liacos, CJ., concurring); see also Minion, supra note
54, at 18 & 31 nn.13-16.
65 See Rinkaus v. Town of Carver, 637 N.E.2d 229, 229-30 (Mass. 1994) (no liability for
failure to provide adequate police protection); Sampson v. Lynn, 537 N.E.2d 588, 589
(Mass. 1989) (no liability for failure to follow proper gun permitting procedures); Nicker-
son v. Commonwealth, 492 N.E.2d 90, 91 (Mass. 1986) (no liability for failure to revoke
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however, in which the court was willing to impose liability on public
employers for the negligent performance of general protective serv-
ices. 66
D. The Statutory Intent and Special Relationship Exceptions: Limiting the
Public Duty Rule
In addition to the statutory intent exception to the public duty
rule articulated in Dimity, which allows public employers to be sued by
plaintiffs who are expressly protected by statute, the Supreme Judicial
Court, recognized a second exception based upon the relationship
between public employers and plaintiffs." In 1984, in Irwin v. Town of
Ware, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a town was liable for its
police officer's failure to arrest an intoxicated motorist who subse-
quently caused an accident resulting in harm to the plaintiffs because
a special relationship existed between the police officer and the plain-
tiffs. 68 This special relationship, the court determined, imposed a spe-
cial duty upon the officer "to take affirmative action to protect the
plaintiff Is]," thereby creating an exception to the public duty rule. 69
Having stopped a motorist on the road for speeding, the police
officer in Irwin subsequently released the motorist who demonstrated
clear signs of intoxication." Ten minutes later, the motorist collided
head-on with the plaintiff's decedents."
Noting the heavy burden required to prove that the motorists
were members of a special statutory class under Dimity's statutory in-
tent exception, the Irwin court articulated another exception to the
public duty rule—the special relationship exception—based upon the
auto registration); Appleton v. Hudson 494 N.E.2d 10, 13 (Mass. 1986) (no liability for
failure to provide adequate police protection); Ribeiro v. Granby, 481 N.E.2d 466, 469
(Mass. 1985) (no liability for failure to enforce housing code); see also Salusti v. Town of
Watertown, 635 N.E.2d 249, 251 (Mass. 1994) (no liability for failure to properly fight fire
and to inspect and repair fire hydrants); Judson v. Essex Agric. and Technical Inst., 635
N.E.2d 1172, 1174-75 (Mass. 1994) (no liability for failure to inspect workplace and to
ensure that employer provided workers' compensation insurance); Connerty v. Metropoli-
tan Dist. Comin'n, 495 N.E.2d 840, 842-44 (Mass. 1986) (no liability for failure to enforce
environmental protection statute).
66 See Glannon, supra note 54, at 18; see also A.L., 521 N.E.2d at 1021, 1023 (exception
to public duty rule because of special relationship between plaintiff and defendant); Irwin
v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1303-04 (Mass. 1984) (same).
67 See Irwin, 467 N.E.2d at 1303-04
68 See id,
" See id, at 1300.
7° See id. at 1304.
71 See id. at 1305.
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existence of a special relationship between the actor whose duty was at
issue and the potential plaintiff. 72 In applying the exception, the Irwin
court first considered the applicable statutes governing police
officers' responsibilities toward intoxicated motorists. 73 The court
noted that although these statutes did not expressly identify the mo-
torists as a protected class under the statutory intent exception, the
statutes evinced a legislative intent to protect both intoxicated persons
as well as other highway users. 74
 More importantly, the court also con-
sidered the foreseeability, immediacy and severity of the risk of harm;
the unique ability of the police officer to prevent the harm; and the
public policy concern for providing an effective remedy for persons
injured by the negligence of public employers, while limiting the
comprehensiveness of the public duty rule.75 In light of statutes "giv-
ing police officers the right to deal with intoxicated persons," as well
as the immediacy and foreseeability of the risk of physical injury "cre-
ated by the negligence of a municipal employee," the court deter-
mined that "a duty of care should reasonably be found."76 Thus, the
Irwin court concluded that because of the existence of a special rela-
tionship between the police officer and the motorists, the officer
72 See Irwin, 467 N.E.2d at 1299-1301; see also Jean W, 610 N.E.2d at 309 (Liacos, C.J.,
concurring). The "special relationship exception," Justice O'Connor explains, is a second
exception to the public duty rule, entirely distinct from the statutory intent exception, and
is based upon situations involving a public employee's specific assurances of protection
that give rise to justifiable reliance by the victim. See, e.g., Jean W, 610 N.E.2d at 317
(O'Connor; J., concurring); Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1357-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring);
A.L., 521 N.E.2d at 1029 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Irwin, 467 N.E.2d at 1311 (Nolan, J.,
dissenting). Although the court in /min stated that it was applying the special relationship
exception to the public duty rule, the exception that the court applied was essentially a
hybrid of the traditional special relationship and statutory intent exceptions. See AL., 521
N.E.2d at 1030 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Indeed, lacking either express or implied repre-
sentations of protection on the part of the police officer, the court in Irwin looked instead
to the legislative intent as well as to the foreseeability of harm as the basis for applying the
special relationship exception—thereby expanding the grounds under which a special
relationship would be found. 'See id. In addition, having relied, in part, upon a broad read-
ing of statutory intent in applying the exception, the court in Irwin borrowed criteria from
Dinsky's statutory intent exception—thus expanding the grounds under which statutory
intent would be found. See id. Thus, "by radically modifying (both] exceptions to the tradi-
tional public duty rule, the court formulated a new rtde"—a "new" special relationship
exception. See id.
73 See Irwin, 467 N.E.2d at 1302.
74 See id. at 1303-04; see also Jean W, 610 N.E.2d at 309 (Liacos, CJ., concurring).
75 See Irwin, 467 N.E.2d at 1299-1300,1304.
76 See id. at 1300,1302.
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owed the motorists a special duty of protection that constituted an
exception to the public duty rule."
In addition to /ruin, the Supreme Judicial Court has applied the
special relationship exception in one other public duty case: A.L.
Commonwealth." In 1988, in A.L., the court held that the common-
wealth was liable for a probation officer's failure to enforce the
specific probation conditions imposed upon a sex offender, who sub-
sequently procured a job working with young boys whom he sexually
molested, because a special relationship existed between the proba-
tion officer and the boys." Having received an eighteen-month sus-
pended sentence conditioned upon his refraining from teaching and
from associating with young boys, the sex offender obtained employ-
ment in a school." The probation officer met with the offender regu-
larly, but never attempted to verify that the offender was neither
teaching nor working in an environment in close proximity to young
boys.81
Despite the lack of any statute specifically identifying the young
boys as a protected class, the court reasoned that "the conditions of pro-
bation imposed by the sentencing judge . . . were designed to protect
young boys" as a class, thus creating a special relationship between the
boys and the probation officer. 82 In addition to the probation condi-
tions, the court also based its finding of a special relationship on the
foreseeability of the risk of molestation created by the officer's failure
to monitor the nature of the offender's employment, the chronic and
" See id. at 1303-04, In a stroughworded dissent, Justice Nolan, joined by Justices
Lynch and O'Connor, argued that the majority decision 'flies hi the face of our decision in
Dinsky u [Town of] Framingham." Id. at 1311 (Nolan, J., dissenting). Justice Nolan argued
that under Din* the public duty rule barred all claims against public employers absent a
special duty owed to specific plaintiffs, "different from that owed to the public at large." Id.
Such a duty, Justice Nolan added, was not present in Irwin because there was no statute
identifying the plaintiffs as a protected class, thus setting them apart from the general
public, and there were no specific assurances of protection giving rise to "justifiable reli-
ance by the victim." See id. By imposing upon the town a duty of protection in the absence
of the requisite special relationship that creates the duty, Justice Nolan accused the major-
ity of abandoning the public duty rule and imposing a new "common law duty" of protec-
tion in its place. See id. at 1312. The effect of discarding Dinsky's statutory intent exception
to the public duty rule in favor of a broader exception that extended "to all possible plain-
tiffs," Justice Nolan added, was both "regrettable" and "frightening." See Irwin, 467 N,E,2d
at 1312.
78 See A.L., 521 N.E.2d at 1020.
79 See id. at 1019-21.
so See id. at 1019.
81 See id.
82 Id. at 1021 (emphasis added).
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immediate nature of the risk of molestation, and the unique ability of
the probation officer—as opposed to the young boys or their par-
ents—to prevent the harm, given his knowledge of the offender's
criminal record." The court concluded that because of this relation-
ship, the probation officer had a special duty to verify the place of the
offender's employment, thus making the public duty rule inapplica-
ble.84
E. Further Eroding the Reach of the Public Duty Rule: Liability Imposed for
Actively Creating the Risk
At the same time that the Supreme Judicial Court was fashioning
exceptions to the public duty rule in Irwin and A.L, a separate line of
83 See A.L., 521 N.E.2d at 1021-23.
84 See id. at 1023. In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that the majority
decision in A.L., like the decision in Irwin, "increase[ed] the already substantial confusion
about ... public tort liability for indirectly caused injuries and losses to private individu-
als." Id. at 1027 (O'Connor; J., dissenting). In contrast to Dinsky, where the court had be-
gun to develop a clear and cohesive theory of public tort liability, Justice O'Connor de-
termined that the court's decision in A.L. was incapable of yielding ''principled and
predictable dispute resolutions in harmony with sound public policy." See id. As to predict-
ability, Justice O'Connor argued that the special relationship exception was "difficult, if
not impossible, to apply evenhandedly and without orientation," and discussed several
cases with facts analogous to those in both Irwin and A.L., where the court nonetheless
concluded that the special relationship exception did not apply. See id. at 1030-33 (discuss-
hug Nickerson, 492 N.E.2d at 91 (finding that special relationship exception did not apply to
conunonwealth's failure to revoke automobile registration of uninsured motorist, despite
existence of statutes pertaining to revocation of automobile registrations, and foreseeable
risk that failure to revoke registrations would cause harm); Appleton, 494 N.E.2d at 12-13;
Ribeiro, 481 N.E.2d at 467-69; Dinsky, 438 N.E.2d at 55-56); see also Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at
1359-60 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding that special relationship exception did not
apply to town's failure to properly fight fire, despite foreseeability and immediacy of risk of
harm to plaintiffs).
In addition to the inconsistent application of the exception, justice O'Connor accused
the majority of formulating a Special relationship exception so broad that the exception in
effect swallowed the public duty rule, thus favoring the compensation of individual plain-
tiffs at the cost of imposing upon governments unacceptably heavy financial burdens that
threatened their ability to function effectively. See A.L., 521 N.E.2d at 1028-30 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor suggested that the court renounce the special relation-
ship exception announced in Irwin and adopted by the majority in AL., and follow the
traditional public rule and its narrow exceptions. See id. at 1032. it may be less than per-
fect," Justice O'Connor added, "but it has the important virtue of being reasonably pre-
dictable, and it properly recognizes as a fact of life that government is unduly burdened by
a rule that permits recovery in any of the situations presented by Dinsky, Irwin, and their
progeny." Id. at 1032. In light of public policy favoring the insulation of governments from
undue financial burdens, the Justice reasoned that, lilt is not unfair in such cases that
plaintiffs must look for compensation to those persons directly responsible for their inju-
ries." Id.
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cases arose that further limited the public duty rule. 85 Notwithstand-
ing VVhitney's and the MTCA's rejection of the misfea-
sance/nonfeasance distinction, this line of cases embraced the dis-
tinction and held that where a public employee acts negligently—
creating a risk of harm that comes to pass—the public duty rule is not
applicable.86 Rather, the employee is liable under a traditional misfea-
sance analysis, whereby "one who takes action ordinarily owes to every-
one else who may be affected thereby a duty to act reasonably."87
In 1990, in Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, the Supreme
Judicial Court held that the public duty rule was not applicable where
a public employee took action that exposed the plaintiff to risk be-
cause the employee was bound "as any other person would be [under
a traditional misfeasance analysis], to act reasonably." 88 In Onofrio, a
Department of Mental Health employee placed a client in a property
owner's home without warning the property owner of the client's
proclivity for starting fires, and the client subsequently set fire to the
home.89
" See Mainulski v. Town of Easthampton, 570 N.E.2d 1028 (Mass. 1991); Onofrio v.
Department of Mental Health, 562 N.E.2d 1341 (Mass. 1990); see also Bruce E. Falby &
John C.P. Goldberg, The Eventful Life, Pending Death, and Possible Salvation of the Public Duty
Rule, 38 BOSTON Bj. 5, 15 (1994).
$6
 See Mamulski, 570 N.E.2d at 1029; Onoflio, 562 N.E.2d at 1344-45; see also supra notes
35, 41 and accompanying text. This line of cases is distinguishable from Irwin and A.L.
because it does not implicate an exception to the public rule by allowing recovery for a pub-
lic employee's failitre to render general protective services. See A.L., 521 N.E.2d at 1021
(finding exception to public duty rule because of special relationship between plaintiff
and defendant); Irwin, 467 N.E.2d at 1303-04 (same). Rather, this line of cases holds that
the public duty rule—"with or without its special relationship exception =is not applicable
in the first instance because the public employee did not merely fail to render general
protective services, but rather, the employee actively created the risk of harm. Onofrio, 562
N.E.2d at 1344-45 (holding public duty rule inapplicable because of defendant's creation
of risk); see Mamulski, 570 N.E.2d at 1029 (same).
Onofrio, 562 N.E.2d at 1345 (emphasis added). For example, where a police officer
negligently drives a cruiser in the course of his employment (i.e., in the course of a "public
duty") and causes an accident, the public duty rule is inapplicable because the officer took
action that cleated risk. See id. at 1344; Glannon, supra note 54, at 18. As a result of his
actions, "the duty owed by the police officer would not have been grounded in his em-
ployment contract but rather would have been the duty of care that every motorist owes to
every one else on the highway." Onofrio, 562 N.E.2d at 1344.
" See id. at 1345. By imposing liability upon the public employer for its employee's
creation of the risk, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the superior court's determination
that the employee owed the property owner a duty of care, but expressly rejected the supe-
rior court's analysis, which was based upon the existence of a special relationship between
the employee and the property owner. See id. at 1344.
" See id. at 1343.
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The Onofrio court based its application of the public duty rule
upon the common law distinction between misfeasance and nonfea-
sance—between "taking action that expose[s] (another) to risk" and
merely failing to prevent a third person's harniful activity.90 The court
reasoned that the public duty rule applied only in situations where "a
plaintiff has been directly harmed by the conduct of a third person
and only indirectly by a public employee's dereliction of a duty—a
duty imposed on him 'solely by his contract of employment—to inter-
rupt or prevent the third person's harmful activity."91 Simply stated,
the court determined that liability would not attach where the public
employer failed to prevent or diminish an independent, third party-
created risk of harm that came to pass. 92 By contrast, under the facts
of Onofrio, the court reasoned that the public employee had created
the risk of harm that came to pass by actively placing the client in the
house, and thus, the employee owed the property owner a duty of rea-
sonable care.95
 In light of the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction,
the Onofrio court concluded that although the public duty rule pro-
tected public employers from liability for failing to prevent interven-
ing third parties' wrongful conduct, liability would apply to an em-
ployee's wrongful, risk-creating acts 94
The court did not address, however, the application of liability to
a situation where, in the absence of an intervening third party, the
employee's apparent failure to act may have created the risk of harm
that came to pass. 95
 This issue presented itself in 1991, in Mamulski
Easthampton, where the Supreme Judicial Court held that the public
duty rule did not apply to a public employee's failure to replace a
missing stop sign because the employee actively created the risk of
harm that came to pass 96 In Mamulski, the plaintiffs decedent was
killed in an automobile accident allegedly resulting from a public
employee's failure to replace a missing stop sign at a major intersec-
9° See id. at 1344-45.
91 Id. at 1344; see Falby & Goldberg, supra note 85, at 15.
92 See Onofrio, 562 N.E.2d at 1344.
93 See id. at 1344-45.
94 See id. But see Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1353-54 (holding that town was not liable under
public duty rule for firefighter's negligence in fighting fire, despite absence of intervening
third party).
95 See Mamulski, 570 N.E.2d at 1029; Onofrio, 562 N.E.2d at 1344-45.
96 See Mamulski, 570 N.E.2d at 1029. By imposing liability upon the town for its em-
ployee's creation of the risk, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the superior court,
which held that the town did not owe the plaintiff's decedent a duty of care because it had





tion, despite numerous warnings by concerned people in the area. 97
The court first analogized to Onofrio,  citing the lack of any wrongful,
third party conduct." Noting the absence of an independently-
created risk of harm, the court reasoned implicitly that were it not for
the employee's failure to replace the stop sign, the risk of a deadly car
accident would not have come to pass.99 The court further reasoned
that because the town controlled the public land upon which motor-
ists traveled and actively held out roads to be reasonably safe for pub-
lk use, the town had "a duty to exercise reasonable care toward per-
sons lawfully on that property." Therefore, the court reasoned
implicitly that by failing to replace the stop sign, the town did not
merely fail to prevent the risk of harm that came to pass, but rather,
the town "itself set"' in motion forces which cause [d] the harm."191
The court concluded that because the public employee actively cre-
ated the risk of harm, the public duty rule did not apply and thus, the
town was liable for the harm that came toap soo2
In contrast to the majority of cases applying the public duty rule
to shield employers from liability, Irwin, A.L., Onofrio and Mamulski
reflected the Supreme Judicial Court's growing dissatisfaction with
the public duty rule's broad application and its interest in shaping
07 See id. at 1028-29.
90 See id. at 1029. Indeed, the driver of the car that collided with the plaintiffs dece-
dent was presumably not negligent in any way. See id. at 1028.
99 Id.
199 See Marnuisiti, 570 N.E.2d at 1029.
101 Id.
104
	 id. The Manzulshi court's characterization of a town's negligent failure to main-
tain public premises as risk-creating conduct, and the court's corresponding decision to
impose liability on the town, paralleled the Supreme Judicial Court's earlier decision in
Doherty v. Town of Belmont. See Doherty v. Town of Belmont, 485 N.E.2d 183, 184-85 (1985).
In Doherty, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a town was liable for injuries sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of the town's failure to maintain a public parking lot. See id. While
walking across the lot, the plaintiff in Doherty injured herself after tripping over the ex-
posed stub of a parking meter that had been negligently removed more than a year earlier.
See id. Although the Doherty court did not expressly address the misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction articulated in Onoftio and AL., the court reasoned implicitly that where claims
arose from the town's role as a landowner, and where the town actively maintained a park-
ing lot for public use, the town's failure to make repairs constituted risk-creating conduct
that violated the duty of reasonable care. See id. Thus, because the town created the risk,
the court concluded that the public duty rule did not apply and that the town was liable.
See id.; see also Sanker v. Town of New Orleans 538 N.E.2d 999, 1000-02 (Mass. 1989) (hold-
ing that town was liable for death of plaintiff's decedent who lost control of motorcycle
after striking tree branch, based upon town's negligent failure to prune tree branch over-
hanging road); Gallant v. City of Worcester, 421 N.E.2d 1196, 1198, 1201 (Mass. 1981)
(holding that city was liable for death of plaintiffs decedent who was struck by car, based
upon city's negligent design, construction and maintenance of public way).
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cohesive and consistent exceptions to the rule. 1°3 Moreover, these
cases also evinced the court's effort to balance public policy issues of
private compensation and public accountability with the protection of
government from crippling financial liability and the creation of in-
centives for the proviskm of public services. 10" In its attempt to narrow
the scope of the public duty rule, however, the court exposed cracks
in the very justification of the rule. 1°5 Indeed, despite the consensus
on granting immunity for public duties under Density, subsequent
court cases had not yet drawn "an intellectually defensible line be-
tween immune 'public' duties and actionable negligence.” 106 Far from
mere aberrations, these exceptional cases were harbingers of change.
F. Cyran v. Town of Ware: Special Exceptions Versus Creation of the Risk
The separate lines of cases narrowing the public duty rule came
together in 1992, in Cyran v. Town of Ware. 1°7 In Cyran, the Supreme
Judicial Court held that a town's firefighters were not liable under the
public duty rule for negligently fighting a fire because the obligation
to provide fire protection was a public duty and plaintiffs were not
members of a statutory class required to trigger a special duty excep-
tion.'" In Cyran, a fire broke out in a two-family residential building
and the plaintiffs alleged that the fire department responded to and
fought the fire negligently, causing foreseeable damage to the prop-
erty. 1°9
 The court reasoned that the fire department's duty was a gen-
eral duty of fire protection owed to the town and required only that
the fire department respond to and deal with the fire as permitted by
their resources and training. 110 Drawing upon the misfea-
sance/nonfeasance distinction articulated in the Onofrio line of cases,
the court reasoned that because the fire department did not actively
create the fire, it was not liable for failing to prevent the damage that
the fire caused." The court explained that the fire department's
conduct was distinguishable from Onofrio and Mamulsiti because the
105 See Glannon, supra note 37, at 64.
104 See Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1358 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1°5 See Glannon, supra note 37, at 64; Memorandum from Senate Judiciary Committee
and Sen. Cheryl A. Jacques 1 (1993) (on file with Sen. Cheryl A. Jacques, Senate Chair,
Post Audit and Oversight Committee) [hereinafter Memorandum].
106 Id. at 64; see also Memorandum, supra note 106, at 1.
1°7 See Falby & Goldberg, supra note 85, at 15.
1418 See Cymn, 597 N.E.2d at 1353-54.
109
 See id. at 1352.
110 See id. at 1354.
111 See id. at 1353-54.
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fire department failed to act to effectively fight the fire, as opposed to
having negligently caused the fire.' 12
The court also ruled out a possible special relationship exception
to the public duty rule because the plaintiffs were not members of a
special statutory class.'" Additionally; the court considered the exis-
tence of a special relationship exception based upon assurances of
special care given by the fire department, but summarily rejected this
theory of exception in the absence of such assurances.'" Finally; the
court determined that imposing liability for negligent firefighting
would violate public policy because cities and towns would be exposed
to liability for damages each time a plaintiff considered a fire depart-
ment's acts to be unsatisfactory.'" Thus, the Cyran court concluded
that in the absence of any statute creating a special relationship, the
town was not liable for the firefighter's negligence under the public
duty rule.n°
In his concurrence, Justice O'Connor supported the court's re-
fusal to impose liability, reasoning that the case fell directly under the
precepts of the public duty rule: that no State, municipality or county
should be liable "for injuries and losses sustained by individuals as a
result of a public employee's failure to act, as required by the terms of
his or her employment, to prevent or diminish the harmful conse-
quences of a condition or situation not originally caused by the em-
ployee."117 Consistent with the majority's holding, Justice O'Connor's
reasoning in support of the public duty rule was implicitly based upon
the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction articulated in Onofrio and
Mamulski, insofar as liability would be imposed for originally causing
the risk of harm (i.e., by actively creating the risk), but not for
"fail[ing] to prevent or mitigate" the risk of harm (by taking no action
at all).10 Moreover, Justice O'Connor's emphasis on "original cause"
implicitly suggested an expansion of the public duty rule as defined
ni See id. at 1355.
115 See Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1353. Insofar as the plaintiffs were unable to cite a statute
imposing such a special duty on the fire department, the court distinguished the case from
Irwin and A.L., where the special relationship exception was applied based upon issues of
foreseeability as well as statutes or ''agreements" extending protection to the respective
classes of plaintiffs. See id. at 1353, 1355-56.
114 See id. at 1354, 1356.
115 See id. at 1354.
II° See id. at 1353-54.
117 Id. at 1357 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
115 See Cyran, 597 N,E.2d at 1360 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Jean W, 610
N,E.2d at 319 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Onofrio, 562 N.E.2d at 1344-45.
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by prior cases. 119
 According to Justice O'Connor, the public duty rule
would apply not only to situations where an employee failed to pre-
vent an independent, third-party-created harm, but also to any situa-
tion "in which a plaintiff has been harmed by a condition or situation
which was not originally caused by the public employee, and is attrib-
utable to the employee only in the sense that the employee failed to
prevent or mitigate it."120 Under Justice O'Connor's formulation, this
"originally caused by" language would shield public employers from
liability for their failure to prevent not only third-party harms, but also
any other harms (including contributory wrongdoing on the part of
the plaintiff or other extraneous causes of harm, like the fire in Cy-
ran) not "originally caused by" public employees. 12'
Justice O'Connor also suggested that only two narrow excep-
tions—neither of which he believed was applicable in Cyram—be made
to the public duty rule to bring it into conformity with the "tradi-
tional" common law rule: first, where a special duty was owed because
the plaintiff was within a specifically identified statutory class; and,
second, where a special relationship existed between the plaintiff and
the public employee insofar as the employee expressly or implicitly
represented to the plaintiff that special care would be taken. 122 By lim-
iting the public duty rule to its traditional exceptions, Justice
O'Connor implicitly rejected the "new" special relationship exception
applied in Irwin and A.L. that established liability on the part of pub-
lic employers. 123
 Contrary to the majority, which distinguished Irwin
and A.L. from Cyran. based upon the existence of special statutory
protection for the plaintiffs, Justice O'Connor argued that but for this
"new" exception, the three cases were factually indistinguishable and
wrongly decided. 124
 Justice O'Connor urged the majority to overrule
116 See Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1357,1360 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120
 Id. at 1360.
121 See Cymn, 597 N.E.2d at 1360 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Jean W, 610
N.E.2d at 311 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
122
 See Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1357-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
123 See id.
121 See id. at 1358-60. Based upon his suggested exceptions to the public duty rule, Jus-
tice O'Connor reasoned that a special relationship exception should not have applied in
either Irwin or A.L. because no statute cited by the plaintiffs in Irwin expressed a legislative
intent to specifically protect the plaintiffs, and no "agreement" cited by the plaintiff in A.L.
constituted a promise to the plaintiff that induced reliance. See id. In addition, the Justice
added, both cases' reliance upon the immediacy and foreseeability of the risk of physical
injury was misplaced. See id. The Justice noted that the very same issues of immediacy and
foreseeability were present in Cyran and were appropriately left out of the majority's analy-
sis—having no place under a traditional public duty analysis. See id. Furthermore, under a
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Irwin and A.L., thereby bringing public duty case law into harmony
with the public duty rule articulated in Cyran. 125 By applying the pub-
lic duty rule, with its narrow exceptions, in this sweeping fashion, Jus-
tice O'Connor emphasized that "the public duty rule in Massachusetts
[would] be made clear," predictability of liability would be greatly im-
proved and the twin public policy concerns of private compensation
and governmental protection would be reasonably balanced. 126
G. The Court Retreats: Jean W. v. Commonwealth and the Abrogation of
the Public Duty Rule
In 1993, in Jean W v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Judicial Court
held that the public duty rule was inconsistent with the MTCA and
thereby announced its intention to abolish the rule prospectively after
the conclusion of the 1993 legislative session. 127
 In Jean W, a Massa-
chusetts Parole Board clerk erroneously granted the parole of a con-
victed murderer. 128 Although the parolee regularly reported to his
parole officer, the officer failed to discover the error. 122 Six months
after his release, the parolee raped, beat and threatened the plaintiff,
who later sued the commonwealth, the parole board and the Depart-
ment of Corrections for negligence. 180
The Massachusetts Superior Court dismissed the claim on the
ground that it was barred by the public duty rule because the plaintiff
had not shown that the defendants owed her a special duty different
from that owed to the general public. 181 On appeal, the plaintiff ar-
gued that a special relationship existed based upon the foreseeability
of the risk of harm to the plaintiff, and therefore, the public duty rule
should not . apply.182 Taking the appeal on its own initiative, the Su-
preme Judicial Court, in a decision featuring four separate concur-
misfeasance/nonfeasance analysis, Justice O'Connor implicitly reasoned that the public
employees in Irwin and A.L., like those in Cyran, did not actively create the risk. See id.
as See id. at 1361 (O'Connor. J., concurring). The majority, however, chose not to
overrule Irwin and A.L., finding that the cases had "their place in a plan of evolving law."
Id. at 1356.
as Id. at 1358, 1361.
127 See Jean W, 610 N.E.2d at 307 (Liacos, CJ., concurring).
128 See id. at 306-07.
129
 See id.
m See id. at 307.
131 See id. at 315.
1 '9 See Jean W., 610 N.E.2d at 307 (Liacos, CJ., concurring).
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ring opinions, abrogated the public duty rule and unanimously re-
versed the lower court's dismissal.'"
According to Chief Justice Liacos, the "inconsistent and irrecon-
cilable parts" of the public duty rule, namely the "public duty-special
relationship dichotomy," had left "both the Justices and the litigants
quite incapable of predicting when and why liability will be im-
posed."1$4 As an example, the Chief Justice articulated the confusion
surrounding the application of the speCial relationship exception by
comparing Irwin and A.L.—where liability was imposed because of a
special relationship exception to the public duty rule—with various
other cases where the public duty rule barred the imposition of liabil-
ity despite the existence of statutes that seemed to confer special rela-
tionships. 155 In addition, Chief Justice Liacos reasoned that, in light of
more recent cases such as Cyran, the framework for applying the pub-
lic duty rule as determined by the court in Onofrio and Mamulski had
also led to inconsistent results. 136 Narrowly interpreting the former
cases to require the presence of an independent, third-party-created
harm in order to trigger the public duty rule, the Chief Justice held
that the public duty rule should not to have applied to Cyran because
there was no intervening perpetrator.'" Moreover, the Chief Justice
explicitly rejected Justice O'Connor's broad interpretation of the Ono-
frio line of cases in Cyran, where Justice O'Connor reasoned that the
public duty rule's application in Onofrio and Mamulski rested not on
the presence or absence of a third-party-created harm, but on
whether the employee "originally caused" the risk of harm. 136 Accord-
ing to the Chief Justice, this misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction was
too flexible to provide "certainty and predictability essential to the
133 See id. at 307.
rx Id. at 307,310.
1355
	 id. at 309-10; see, e.g., Sampson, 537 N.E.2d at 589 (statutes governing issuance of
firearms permits did not create special relationship between city and victim of gunshot);
Connerty, 495 N.E.2d at 842-44 (statutes prohibiting pollution of tidal waters and statutes
governing issuance of clamming permits did not create special relationship between envi-
ronmental agency and injured clam digger); Appleton, 492 N.E.2d at 12-13 (statutes gov-
erning issuance of liquor licenses did not create special relationship between town and
plaintiffs injured by intoxicated motorists); Nickerson, 492 N.E.2d at 91 (statutes governing
revocation of motor vehicle registration did not create special relationship between com-
monwealth and injured motorist); Ribeiro, 481 N.E.2d at 467-69 (statutes requiring specific
means of egress from apartment did not create special relationship between town and
decedent).
136 SeeJean W, 610 N.E.2d at 310-12 (Liacos, Cj., concurring) .
"7 See id. at 311.
138 See id at 311-12.
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law," because the defendants' conduct in Mamulski and Gyran could
be characterized as either acting negligently (misfeasance) or failing
to act at all (nonfeasance), thus leading to contradictory outcomes. 132
In addition to the confusion engendered by the, inconsistent ap-
plication of the public duty rule, the Chief Justice likened the rule's
comprehensiveness to the "antiquated and outmoded concepts of
sovereign immunity" that the court and the Legislature had shed, re-
spectively, in Whitney and in the MTCA.14° Calling attention to the
fundamental inconsistency between the abolition of sovereign immu-
nity and the preservation of the public duty rule, the Chief Justice
criticized the unfairness inherent in a rule that resulted in "a duty to
none when there is a duty to all" on the one hand, and "tortured
analyses" resulting from desperate attempts by courts "to avoid harsh
results without squarely facing the problem" on the other."' The
Chief Justice suggested that abrogation of the public duty rule would
remedy such discrepancies by eliminating the distinction between pri-
vate persons and public employers as envisioned by the MTCA and
thus would regularize the imposition of liability.' 42 Acknowledging
fears of the potential financial burden that would be imposed on pub-
lic employers by the rule's abrogation, the Chief Justice indicated that
the plaintiff's burden of proof of negligence (duty-breach-causation-
damages) and the statutory cap on damages, in addition to preexist-
ing immunity for discretionary acts under § 10(b) and intentional
torts under § 10(c), would protect the commonwealth from spiraling
costs.m Finally, turning to the facts of Jean W, the Chief Justice held
139 Id. at 312; sec Filthy & Goldberg, supra note 85, at 17.
149 See 610 N.E.2d at 307 (Liacos, Cj., concurring).
141 See id. at 313.
142 See id. at 312. Rejecting the public duty rule's insulation of uniquely "public" duties
merely because they are owed to the public as a whole and not to private individuals. Chief
Justice Liacos reasoned implicitly that all duties—public and private—must be exercised
with reasonable care and subject to the common law of negligence. See id. "The fact that a
public employee's employment imposes on him an affirmative duty to act where a private
person would not have such a duty," the Justice explained, "does no more than identify the
source of the duty. [Indeed, p]rivate persons have affirmative duties arising from their
employment responsibilities that [public employees] do not have." Id. Thus, whether pub-
lic or private, the duty to act reasonably is the same. See id.
143 See Jean W. 610 N.E.2d at 313-14.& n.11 (Liacos, CJ., concurring). Chief Justice
Liacos noted that "Millie a sizable number of jurisdictions still adhere to the public duty
rule ... the trend has been to abolish the rule"—especially among jurisdictions that pro-
vide other limitations on governmental liability, such as a discretionary act exception. Id. at
312-43 & n.10. The following jurisdictions have abolished the public duty rule: Alaska,
Arizona. Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Oregon, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See id.; Valkenburgh, supra note 25, at 1108 n.91.
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that the case be remanded to allow the plaintiffs to establish the exis-
tence of a special relationship between either themselves and the de-
fendants or between the defendants and the third party perpetrator
(a second type of special relationship), which would trigger a duty of
protection."4
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Nolan and Lynch, supported
the reversal of the lower court's decision based upon the misfea-
sance/nonfeasance distinction."5
 Applying the reasoning of Onofrio,
Justice O'Connor determined that Jean W. was "not a case in which
the plaintiffs were injured as a result of a public employee's failure to
act to rectify a situation not created by the employee," but rather, the
employee actively exposed the plaintiff to a new risk by releasing the
convicted murderer."6
 Despite his refusal to apply the public duty
rule in Jean W., however, Justice O'Connor did not support abrogation
of the public duty rule. 147
 Rather, Justice O'Connor championed the
rule's application in previous cases as being consistent with traditional
tort principles of misfeasance and nonfeasance, as well as with current
social values and public policy concerns of private compensation,
governmental protection and predictability."8
Furthermore, in opposition to Chief Justice Liacos' assertion that
the public duty rule had no basis in principles of misfeasance and
nonfeasance, Justice O'Connor vehemently argued that "there [is] no
question about it. ... The traditional public duty rule does make such
a distinction," and that "for nearly ninety years the court has been dis-
tinguishing between a defendant's acts and omissions in determining
whether a duty of care exists . ..." 149
 This distinction, Justice
O'Connor reasoned, was well-established in prior case law where the
court consistently held that public employees, "required by the terms
of their employment to prevent or diminish harmful consequences to
the public of conditions or situations not originally caused by the em-
ployees, did not owe to individual members of the public a duty of
1." See Jean W, 610 N.E.2d at 315 (Liacos, CI, concurring).
145
 See id. at 316-17 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Falby & Goldberg, supra note 85, at 18.
' 46Jean W. 610 N.E.2d at 316-17 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
147
 See id. at 316.
148 See id. at 317-18; see, e.g., Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1353 (public duty rule applied where
firefighters failed to extinguish fire that they did not originate or aggravate); Mamulski,
570 N.E.2d at 1029 (public duty rule did not apply where town failed to replace sign on
public way that they actively maintained for travel).
549
 Jean IE. 610 N.E.2d at 318-19 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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protection commensurate with their duty to the public as a whole."'"
Justice O'Connor argued that by abrogating the public duty rule the
court not only paved the way for broad-based public tort liability, but
also destroyed the critical distinction between acts and omissions—
thus imposing a duty of care upon public employees regardless of
whether they created the risk of harm. 151
Moreover, according to Justice O'Connor, this "new" duty of care
ran counter to the purpose and intent of the MTCA. 152
 Indeed,
whereas the MTCA sought to make public employers liable in the
same circumstances that would result in private employer liability, Jus-
tice O'Connor determined that the court's abrogation of the public
duty rule and its attendant undermining of the misfea-
sance/nonfeasance distinction would force public employers to
shoulder an additional burden of liability not borne by private indi-
viduals. 1" This new duty, Justice O'Connor reasoned implicitly, would
make public employers liable for their failure to act in response to a
situation that they did not create, i.e. nonfeasance, but would have no
application to private individuals' failure to prevent or diminish
harm.154 Justice O'Connor thus concluded that the public duty rule
properly gauged the imposition of governmental liability under the
MTCA and cautioned against its proposed abrogation, which he de-
termined would lead to catastrophic governmental liability by creat-
ing entirely new duties for public employers. 155
130 Id. at 319 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Nickerson, 492 N.E.2d at 91 (holding that
commonwealth was not liable for injury to motorist by uninsured motorist under public
duty rule, based upon commonwealth's failure to revoke registration of uninsured motor-
ist); Appkton, 492 N.E.2d at 12-13 (holding that town was not liable for injury to motorists
by intoxicated minors under public duty rule, based upon town's failure to prevent under-
aged drinking at club); Ribeiro, 481 N.E.2d at 467-69 (holding that town was not liable for
injury to apartment resident by fire under public duty rule, based upon town's failure to
require second means of egress from apartment).
tat See Jean W., 610 N.E.2d at 319-20 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
152 See id.
In See id.
164 See id. justice O'Connor added that:
In the absence of a "special relationship" of the kind contemplated by the
traditional public duty rule, this court has never held that a private party is li-
able in tort for failing to prevent or diminish harm due to a condition or
situation that the private party did not create, and nothing in the 1/viTCA1
provides that a public employee or public employer is subject to a different
rule.
Id
155 See id. at 318-19. In another concurring opinion, Justices Wilkins and Abrams sup-
ported abrogation of the public duty rule in lieu of its inconsistent evolution, as demon-
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H. The 1993 Amendments to the MTCA: Codifying the Public Duty Rule
Prompted by the court's announcement in Jean W that it would
abrogate the public duty rule and by fears of unlimited liability for
cities and towns, the MTCA was amended to protect public employers
from liability in situations previously covered by the common law pub-
lic duty rule. 156
 The MTCA amendments, added by Statute 1993,
chapter 495, were enacted as part of the supplemental budget and
took effect when the governor signed. the budget on January 14,
1994. 157
 The amendments added several new exceptions to liability for
public employers under § 10 of the MTCA. 158
 Closely paralleling the
holdings of prior public duty cases, the first four subsections,
§§ 10(e)-10(h), immunize public employers from any claim based
upon the execution or failure to execute specific public functions.'"
Specifically, § 10(e) shields public employers from liability for negli-
gent licensing; 160
 § 10(f) bars liability for negligent inspection by pub-
lic employers; 161
 § 10(g) bars liability for negligent fire prevention
strated by the lower court's erroneous application of the public duty rule in Jean W, which
clearly involved "active wrongdoing." See id. at 316 (Wilkins, J., concurring). In light of the
futility involved in distinguishing between active negligence and the failure to act, the jus-
tices argued that both should be excepted from the public duty rule. Id.; Falby & Gold-
berg, supra note 85, at 17. Finally, the Justices warned that even with the abrogation of the
public duty rule, all problems would not be solved as difficult line-drawing would endure
in proving causation under a traditional tort analysis. See Jean W, 610 N.E.2d at 315-16
(Wilkins, J., concurring)
In a final concurring opinion in Jean IV, Justice Greaney supported abrogation of the
public duty doctrine and emphasized the importance of legislative action within the pro-
spective period designated by the court. See id. at 320-.21 (Greaney, J., concurring); Falby &
Goldberg, supra note 85, at 17-18. Not persuaded by Justice O'Connor's support for the
public duty rule, and unconvinced by Chief Justice Liacos' balancing of private and public
activities, Justice Greaney called upon the Legislature to determine the scope of govern-
mental liability in light of previous case law under the MTCA and the statute's original
intent. See Jean W, 610 N.E.2d at 320-21 (Greaney, J., concurring). Without legislative ac-
tion, Justice Greaney reasoned, abrogation of the rule would not clarify current inconsis-
tencies, and might lead to "a deluge of lawsuits against governmental agencies, particularly
municipalities," which would exact a heavy toll both in terms of damages paid as well as in
defense costs. Id. at 321.
156 .See Glannon, supra note 54, at 17.
167 See id. at 17 & 31 11.4.
168 See Glannon, supra note 54, at 19.
159
 See id.; Memorandum, supra note 106, at 1.
160 See MASS. Gnu. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(e) (1998); see also Nickerson, 492 N.E.2d at 91 (no
liability for failure to revoke motor vehicle registration); Sampson, 537 N.E.2d at 588-89
(no liability for failure to follow proper procedure in issuing gun permit).
161 See Mass. GEN. Laws ch. 258, § 10(f) (1998); see also Ribeiro, 481 N.E.2d at 466,468—
69 (no liability for failure to abate dangerous condition revealed by inspection); Dinsky,
March 2000]	 Public Duty Rule	 411
(not including claims based upon the negligent operation of motor
vehicles); 162 and § 10(h) bars liability for negligent police protection
(not including claims based upon the negligent operation of motor
vehicles, or the negligent protection, supervision or care of persons in
custody). 165 In addition, § 10(i) shields public employers from liability
for claims based upon the release, parole or escape of persons in pub-
lic custody, unless. gross negligence is shown.'" Together, these
amendments codify the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Dinsky
and its progeny—that public employers should not be held liable for
negligence in broad public oversight functions. 165
In contrast to the above-mentioned sections that provide public
employers with immunity for specific public functions, § 10(j) applies
to all public functions—shielding public employers from liability for
"any claim based on an act or failure to act to prevent or diminish the
harmful consequences of a condition or situation, including the vio-
lent or tortious conduct of a third person, which is not originally
caused by the public employer or any other person acting on behalf
of the public employer."166 In the wake of the court's abrogation of
the common law public duty rule in Jean § 10(j) was intended to
replace the rule by providing a broad, catch-all exception to liability
for public employers, not limited to any particular public function. 167
438 N.E.2d at 55-56 (no liability for failure to properly inspect premises before issuing
building permit).
162 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(g) (1998); see also Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1353-54
(no liability for failure to properly fight fire).
162 See. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258. § 10(h) (1998); see also Appleton, 494 N.E.2d at 12-13
(no liability for failure to enforce traffic laws).
1( 1 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(i) (1998). Section 10(i) represents a compro-
mise between cases like Onofrio that advocate the imposition of public liability where the
public employer '`takes charge of the person who poses a threat of harm," and cases like
Jean W which bar liability unless the plaintiff can prove the existence of a special relation-
ship. See also Clannon, supra note 54, at 25. Thus, under section I0(1), public liability may
be imposed in the absence of a spicial relationship, but only if the public employee is
grossly negligent. See Glannon, supra note 54. at 25.
166 See Clannon, supra note 54, at 17-19; Valkenburgh, supra note 25, at 1101.
166
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(j) (1998); see Glannon, supra note 54, at 19.
167 See Muslims, supra note 54, at 19, 25; Memorandum, supra note 106, at 2. Following
the court's decision in Jean W, public employers pressed the Legislature for an amend-
ment to the MTCA that would provide general protection to public employers, citing the
potential for costly law suits. See Glannoti, supra note 54. at 25. Municipal lawyers echoed
these sentiments in their defense of the proposed amendments, asserting that the abroga-
tion of the common law public duty rule would deal a "harsh financial blow" to local gov-
ernments, the state, and the states' residents as well. See Claire P. Rattigan, Bar Debates Fu-
ture of Public Duty Doctrine, MASS. LAW. WKLY., August 9,1993, at 3. Hyannis town counsel,
Robert D. Smith, argued that public employers should not be "treated like anybody else,"
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Consistent with the Onofrio line of cases decided by the Supreme
Judicial Court, § 10( j) : is founded upon a misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction: a public employer will be held liable for actively creating a
risk of harm that comes to pass, but will not be held liable for failing
to prevent a risk of harm "not originally caused by the public em-
ployee," even where the employee has a statutory or contractual em-
ployment duty to act. 1 " Section 10(j)'s "originally caused by" phrase
thus sharpens Onofrio's misfeasance/nonfeasance inquiry by empha-
sizing the employee's material involvement in the creation of the risk
of harm as grounds for imposing or refusing to impose § 10(j) Habil-
ity. 169
 Furthermore, as alluded to above, the emphasis on original cau-
sation also expands the scope eof the public duty rule by shielding
public employers from liability for failure to prevent not only third-
party-created risks of harm, but any risks of harm not originally
caused by public employees. 170
Reluctant to provide unqualified immunity to public employers
who failed to prevent harm, the drafters of the MTCA amendments
crafted several exceptions to § 10(j) that are consistent with the hold-
ings of prior public duty cases."' Section 10(j) (1) embodies a re-
because, unlike private employers, "Rif a private company does a wrong and judgment is
rendered, the company goes out of business and society rolls merrily along.... Does that
happen with government?" Id. Critics of the proposed amendments argued that the public
duty rule created unreasonable protection front liability for public employers. Id. Michael
E. Moue, president-elect of the Massachusetts Bar Association, added that such
"[i]mmunity creates irresponsibility," and that in light of the confusion surrounding the
court's enforcement of the public duty rule, Mone added, 'This is the one time when the
appropriate action for the Legislature is to do nothing.... When you cannot explain the
rule, you ought to abolish it." Id.
168
 See Cimino'', supra note 54, at 26.
169 See id. at 26-27.
170 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. Joseph W. Glannon provides several ex-
amples of how the "originally caused by" phrase applies to bar liability under § 10( j). See
Cimino'', supra note 54, at 26. He suggests that where "a town health director is notified
that a rabid raccoon is running loose but delays in responding," and where child is bit-
ten by the raccoon," § 10(j) would apply. Id. Even though there was technically no inter-
veiling third party, and even though the health director "might have averted the harm by
timely response," the health inspector did not create the "situation" that came to pass. See
id. Rather, "the situation which injured the child was a rabid raccoon." Id. In addition,
where "a motorist's car breaks down on a highway on a cold night, and the motorist suffers
hypothermia," § 10(j) would apply. Id. Even though there is no intervening third party,
and even though the town might have averted the harm by "[adequately] patrolling the
highway for stranded motorists," the weather and the breakdown of the car—not the
town's employees—created the situation which caused harM. See Glannon, supra note 54,
at 26.
17' See MASS. Gm LAWS ch. 258, § 10(j) (1)-(4) (1998); see also Glannon, supra note 54,
at 27.
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stricted form of the traditional special relationship exception, provid-
ing that § 10(j) will not apply where public employees give specific
assurances of safety or assistance—beyond general representations
that investigation or assistance will be or has been undertaken—to an
individual or to a member of the individual's family and where the
individual or family member relies on those assurances to their detri-
ment. 172 Section 10(j) (1) reflects the common law view that even
where a public employee does not create the risk of harm, an em-
ployee's assurances to a plaintiff that special care will be taken "jus-
tify[] the plaintiff's reliance on the employee's carrying out his re-
sponsibility:173 Additionally, § 10(j) (2) bars the application of § 10(j)
to any claim based upon the actual intervention of a public employee
that causes injury to the victim or places the victim in a worse position
than he was in before the intervention. 174 This exception reflects tra-
ditional common law tort principles insofar as it allows the imposition
of liability against a rescuer who negligently assists a victim or who ac-
tively creates the risk of harm that comes to pass. 173 Consistent with
Doherty v. Belmont, where, in 1985, the Supreme Judicial Court held
that negligent maintenance of property was risk-creating conduct and
was therefore actionable under the MTCA, § 10(j) (3) excludes negli-
gent maintenance of public property from protection under
§ 10 (j) . 176 Finally, § 10(j) (4) prevents the immunization of public
employers for negligent medical or other therapeutic treatment and
172 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10( j) (1); see also Cimino'', supra note 54, at 27-28.
173 AL., 521 N.E.2d at 1029; see Glannon, supra note 54, at 28. In addition to § 10( j),
§§ 10(f), (g) and (h) also provide for the imposition of liability under § 10(j)(1) where
specific assurances of safety or assistance are given. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, §§ 10(f)—
(h) (1998).
174 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(j) (2); see also Glannon, supra note 54, at 28.
m See °imam, supra note 54, at 28.
176 See Mass. GEN. Laws ch. 258, § 10(j) (3); see Doherty, 485 N.E.2d at 185; Glannon,
supra note 54, at 28-29. Liability for negligent maintenance of public property under
§ 10(j) (3) is limited, however, by chapter 21, section 17C(a) of the General Laws of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which states, in relevant part, that
jalny person having an interest in land	 who lawfully permits the public to
use such land for recreational, conservation, scientific, educational, environ-
mental, ecological, research, religious, or charitable purposes without impos-
ing a charge or fee therefor ... shall not be liable for personal injuries or
property damage sustained by such members of the public, including without
limitation a minor, while on said land in the absence of willful, wanton, or
reckless conduct by such person.
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 21, § 17C(a) (1998); see Glannon, supra note 54, at 28-29.
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is consistent with prior case law that held medical malpractice action-
able under the MTCA. 177
II. THE APPLICATION OF -THE STATUTORY PUBLIC DUTY RULE,
SECTION 10 )
In the wake of the MTCA amendments, the Supreme Judicial
Court wasted no time in applying § 10( j)'s statutory public duty im-
munity.'" In applying § 10(j), the court did not attempt to define the
plain language of the provision, but rather imposed liability on public
employers for creating the risk, consistent with Onofrio's misfea-
sance/nonfeasance distinction.'" Thus, in 1994, in Pallazola v. Town of
Foxborough, the Supreme Judicial Court held that § 10(j) applied ret-
roactively to bar a plaintiff's claim against a town for failure to provide
sufficient police protection and prevent the unlawful removal of a
177 See Glannon, supra note 54, at 29; Memorandum, supra note 106, at 2. Section
10( j)'s exceptions do not include either a statutory intent exception as distussed hn Dinsky,
or a special relationship exception of the Irwin-A.L. variety. See Mass. Gm Laws. ch. 258,
§ 10(j) (1)—(4) (1998); see also supra notes 54-84. Thus, even if the harm that comes to pass
is foreseeable, and even if the public employee has a statutory or employment duty to act,
§ 10(j) provides that the public employer is not liable for acting or failing to act to prevent
harmful consequences. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 258, § 10(j)(1)—(4); see also Pallazola 1'.
Town of Foxborough, 640 N.E.2d 460, 462 (Mass. 1994) (refusing to create new exception
from immunity in addition to those already enumerated under § 10( j)).
178 See Carleton v. Town of Framingham, 640 N.E.2d 452, 455 (Mass. 1994), Indeed,
section 144 of Statute 1993, chapter 495, provided that the 1993 amendments to the
MTCA would "apply to all claims upon which a final judgment has not entered, or as to
which an appeal is pending or the appeal period has not expired, and to all claims upon
which suit is filed after the effective date of this act." See id. Consistent with these terms, in
1994, in Carleton, the Supreme Judicial Court held that retroactive application of the 1993
amendments to abolish the plaintiffs' claims did not deny the plaintiffs clue process of law
in violation of the state or federal constitutions. See id. at 458. Despite the Legislature's
codification of the public duty rule through the passage of § 10(j) in January of 1994, and
its manifest intent that § 10( j) apply to cases pending appeal, several cases pending review
before the Supreme judicial Court in May of 1994 were decided on the basis of the common
law public duty rule. See id.; see also Rinkaus v. Town of Carver, 637 N.E.2d 229, 229—
30(Mass. 1994) (holding that the common law public duty rule was applicable); Judson v.
Essex Agric, and Technical Inst., 635 N.E.2d 1172, 1172 (Mass. 1994)(holding the same);
Salusti v. Town of Watertown, 635 N.E.2d 249, 250-51 (Mass. 1994) (holding the same). But
see Pallazola, 640 N.E.2d at 461-62 (§ 10(j) (holding that the C0111111011 law rule was not
applicable). Filially, in December of 1994, in Bonnie W u Commonwealth, the Supreme
Judicial Court announced its intention to preempt the common law public duty rule by
applying only § 10(j) to claims involving public duty issues. See Bonnie W. v.
Commonwealth, 643 N.E.2d 424, 427 (Mass. 1994). The court stated that, "We do not
intend to have applicable both the legislated public duty rule and a common law public
duty rule that might be applicable when the legislated public duty rule is inapplicable." Id.
at 426-27.
179 See, e.g., Lawrence v. City of Cambridge, 664 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Mass. 1996); Bonnie W,
643 N.E.2d at 426-27; Pallazola, 640 N.E.2d at 462
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portion of an aluminum goal post from a football stadium.'" In Pal-
lazola, the plaintiff was seriously injured when a portion of a goal post,
removed and carried by other spectators, came into contact with an
overhead power line and fell on him. 181 Relying on the plain language
of § 10(j), the court held that § 10(j) barred the plaintiffs claim be-
cause the failure to prevent harm fell within the limits of the public
duty rule.'"
In December of 1994, in Bonnie W. v. Commonwealth, the Supreme
Judicial Court held that the commonwealth was not liable for a parole
officer's negligent failure to supervise a parolee and prevent the pa-
rolee from gaining access to the plaintiff's mobile home that resulted
in the sexual assault of the plaintiff.'" Conversely, the Bonnie W. court
held that the commonwealth was liable for the parole officer's negli-
gent recommendation of the parolee's continued employment to
park management as well as the officer's misrepresentation of the pa-
rolee's criminal history.' 84 In Bonnie W, a man convicted of rape and
robbery was released on parole and then hired as a maintenance man
at a trailer park in which the plaintiff lived. 185 In the ensuing months,
the parole officer failed to meet with the parolee as the parole board
rules required and, in response to questions by park management
pertaining to the parolee's employment, the parole officer negligently
recommended the parolee's continued employment at the park and
made several misrepresentations about the parolee's criminal rec-
ord.'" Possessing keys to all of the park units, the parolee gained ac-
cess to the plaintiff's mobile home and sexually assaulted her. 18/
Because the plaintiff's claim of negligent supervision was based
. upon the negligent failure of the parole officer to prevent harm, as
specifically excluded by § 10(j), the court reasoned that § 10(j)
barred that claim." Relying upon Onofrio's misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction, however, the court reasoned that the commonwealth was
liable for the parole officer's negligent recommendation of the pa-
rolee's continued employment at the trailer park and misrepresenta-
188 See Pallazola, 640 N.E.2d at 461.
181 See id.
182 See id. at 462.
I83 Bonnie W, 643 N.E.2d at 426.
181 See id. at 425-26.
185 See id.
188 See id. at 426.
181 See ed.
188 See Bonnie W, 643 N.E.2d at 426.
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tion of the parolee's criminal history. 189
 Insofar as the parole officer
"[took) action that exposed the plaintiff to risk," the court reasoned
that the parole officer "was bound, as any other person would be, to
act reasonably." Thus, the court concluded that § 10(j) barred the
plaintiffs claim based on the parole officer's negligent supervision
because such conduct constituted a failure to prevent harm. 191 The
court also held that § 10(j) did not bar the plaintiffs claim based on
the parole officer's negligent recommendation and misrepresentation
because such conduct constituted an active creation of the risk of
hann. 192
In addition, in 1996, in Lawrence v. City of Cambridge, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated, in dictum, that insofar as the
police did not make explicit and specific assurances of safety or assis-
tance to the plaintiff, § 10(j) barred a storeowner's claim against the
city based upon the failure of the police to protect him from attack.' 93
In Lawrence, third-party assailants assaulted a storeowner outside of his
store, after which he identified the suspects for police who subse-
quently arrested the assailants. 194
 In light of one assailant's extensive
criminal record, the police promised to protect the plaintiff in the
days leading' up to the assailant's arraignment and did so for three
consecutive days. 195
 On the fourth day, the police were not present
and the plaintiff was shot after closing the store. 196 Briefly reiterating
the plain language of § 10(j), the court stated that absent explicit and
specific assurances, § 10(j) barred the plaintiff's claim based on the
police officers' failure to fulfill their promise of protection because
such conduct constituted a failure to prevent harm. 197
Consistent with the reasoning of the Supreme Judicial Court, the
Massachusetts Appeals Court likewise based its application of § 10(j)
on an implicit misfeasance/nonfeasance analysis, while refusing to
define the plain language of the provision. 198
 Thus, in 1998, in Allen v.
189 See id. at 426-27.
190 Id. at 427.
191 See id. at 426-27.
192 See id.
'" See Lawrence, 664 N.E.2d at 3. Despite the applicability of § 10( j), the court in Law-
rence held that because the police officers may have given "explicit and specific assurances
of safety or assistance" to the plaintiff, the § 10(j)(1) exception prevented § 10(j) from
barring the suit. Id. at 3-4.
194 See id. at 2.
199 See id.
08 See id.
197 See id. at 3.
188 See Allen v. City of Boston, 693 N.E.2d 699,700-01 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
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City of Boston, the Massachusetts Appeals Court denied a city's motion
for summary judgment, holding that § 10(j), in the absence of fur-
ther evidence, did not bar the plaintiffs claim against the city based
on the school's negligent "handling" of a student (Mr. Reynolds), who
fatally stabbed a fellow student.' In Allen, Mr. Reynolds had been
suspended from two other schools for possessing a knife, before being
enrolled at the school in which the attack occurred."° The school
provided no evidence in support of their motion for summary judg-
ment—other than the text of the "Boston Public Schools Code of Dis-
cipline"—that they considered questions of whether to enroll Mt
Reynolds at the school; whether to integrate Mr. Reynolds with the
general school population; and how to oversee Mr. Reynold's atten-
dance."' In addition, the school supplied no evidence detailing its
consideration of security questions in light of the threat of harm that
Mr. Reynolds posed.202 The court reasoned implicitly that because the
school knew of the threat posed by Mt Reynolds and nevertheless ac-
tively enrolled him without concern for his placement at the school or
the safety measures in existence, the city failed to adequately support
the contention that it was immune from liability under § 10(j) for Mr.
Reynolds' violent act. 203 Thus, the court concluded that § 10(j) did
not bar the plaintiffs claim because based on the evidence, the city
the did not establish that the school merely failed to prevent harm.204
199 See id.
R°° See id. at 700.
"1 See id.
2°2 See id. at 700-01.
"3 See Allen, 693 N.E.2d at 700. Despite the school's assertion that its "handling" of
Reynolds with respect to placement and security issues was protected tinder §10(b) be-
cause it involved "weighing alternatives and making choices with respect to public policy
and planning," as opposed to "merely acting ministerially in implementing established
policy," the court held that the claimed § 10(b) immunity suffered from the same lack of
factual support that prevented the application of § 10(j) immunity. Id. at 701.
2" See id. at 700-01. Emphasizing the almost complete lack of evidence offered by the
city in support of its motion for summary judgment, the Appeals Court implied that any
evidence ("deposition, affidavit, or otherwise") showing that the school considered both
the placement of Mr. Reynolds and the security of the school might be sufficient to sup-
port the claimed § 10( j) immunity. See id. at 700-01. The court added that § 10(j) immu-
nity is by no means a heavy burden for public employers to meet: "We are not suggesting
that [the § 10(j) defense is] maintainable only by heroic amounts of evidence on the part
of the public employer. On the contrary, the cases show that the evidence can often be
readily assembled and presented where it exists." Id. at 701.
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III. BRUM V. TOWN OF DARTMOUTH: CHRONICLING AN INTERPRETIVE
QUAGMIRE
Despite its several interpretations of § 10(j), the Supreme Judi-
cial Court did not directly address § 10 ( j)'s plain language until 1999,
in Bruin II, in which the court held that a town was not liable for the
death of a student in the school because the school officials' failure to
implement proper security measures and to apprehend the attackers
did not "originally cause" the condition or situation that led to the
harm.205 Because Brum II represents the Supreme Judicial Court's
most recent and most comprehensive analysis of § 10(j), its holding
provides the benchmark against which all future public tort liability
cases will be measured. 206
 Moreover, Brunt II reversed the Massachu-
setts Appeals Court in Brum I, which departed from prior public duty
jurisprudence (favoring public immunity) and held that a school was
liable for failure to properly secure the school and to deter attack=
ers.207
 The appeals court's decision in Brum I, although subsequently
reversed, is important because of the Supreme Judicial Court's adop-
tion of portions of its reasoning and because of its uniqueness in the
scheme of Massachusetts public duty jurisprudence. 205
A. The Lower Courts' Treatment
On April 12, 1993, shortly before the beginning of classes at
Dartmouth High School, two groups of youths, including several
Dartmouth High School students, were involved in a violent alterca-
tion on the school premises. 209 Tensions between the two groups had
escalated during the prior week and had erupted in a physical con-
frontation on the previous evening.210 School officials detained two of
Jason Robinson's friends for their role in the altercation on the morn-
ing of April 12.211
 The other group of youths immediately fled the
school following the incident.212
 One of the detained students in-
volved in the ongoing dispute warned the principal that at least three
youths from the opposing group had threatened to return to the high
205 See Brum v. Town of Dartmouth, 704 N.E.2d 1147, 1153 (Mass. 1999).
2°6 See id.
202 See Bl'UlIl V. Town of Dartmouth, 690 N.E.2d 844, 850-51 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998),
revel, 704 N.E.2d 1147 (Mass. 1999).
208 See infra notes 222-242 and accompanying text.
2°9 Brum, 690 N.E.2d at 846.
al° See id.
211 See id.
212 See id. at 847.
March 20001
	
Public Duty Ride	 419
school to retaliate against him and his friends, including Robinson. 2"
Shortly after 8:00 A.M., the principal and other school officials wit-
nessed the trio enter the front door of the high schoo1. 2" The intrud-
ers openly brandished weapons, including two knives, a billy club, a
baseball bat and a length of pipe. 215 The school officials did nothing
to confront or obstruct the three youths, who proceeded unimpeded
to a second-floor classroom.216 At least two of the three students en-
tered a social studies classroom believing that they would find a par-
ticular individual, and when they failed to find him, they instead at-
tacked and stabbed Robinson, who died in the classroom. 217
In 1995, Robinson's mother, Elaine Brum, commenced action
against the town of Dartmouth, school officials and other municipal
officials.215 The plaintiff sought damages for the violation of Robin-
son's federal and state civil rights, for Robinson's wrongful death and
for negligence under the MTCA, including (1) the failure of the re-
sponsible municipal officials and school officials to institute any secu-
rity measures to protect the high school students, and (2) the failure
of the principal to respond to the foreseeable (and explicitly fore-
warned) threat of harm that the youths who murdered Robinson pre-
sented.219 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. 225
On October 20, 1995, a judge of the Bristol Superior Court of
Massachusetts granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the town
was immune from liability because (1) the adoption of security meas-
ures was a discretionary function under § 10(b), and (2) the school
officials' failure to act—while not a discretionary function—fell within
the "public duty rule" of § 10(j). 221 The plaintiff appealed, and in
February, 1998, in a 2-1 vote, the Massachusetts Appeals Court re-
versed the judgment with respect to the negligence claims. 222 The
court held that the school had no discretion to adopt and implement
213 See a




218 See id. at 846.
212
 See Brun, 690 N.E.2d at 846-47.
22° See id. at 846.
221 See id. at 847. The judge of the Massachusetts Superior Court held that although
the principal's alleged negligent failure to anticipate, and to establish and enforce ade-
quate security in light of the 'serious and specific threat of immediate harm to students on
April 12,1993'" fell within the public duty ride of § 10(j), the principal's conduct was not
a discretionary function under § 10(b). Id. at 847 it.5
222 See id. at 849-51.
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a school safety policy because of a state statute requiring schools to
publish policies pertaining to student and teacher conduct, and to
enact safety standards and procedures at the schoo1. 223
 Therefore, the
court determined that the officials' failure to take such action was not
immune under § 1 0(b) .224
 The court also held that the school
officials' failure to prevent harm was not immune under § 10(j) be-
cause the failure to implement a safety policy, along with the failure to
deter the trio from proceeding into the school, "caused" the "condi-
tion" that led to the murder.225
Turning to § 10(j), the appeals court framed the issue as whether
the school's failure to adopt or implement any security measures, as
well as the school officials' failure to deter the "known and imminent
threat" posed by the attackers' entry into the school, originally caused
the condition or situation that led to the death of Robinson.226
 Find-
ing no case definitively interpreting the meaning of the words "not
originally caused by," the court decided that it was able to apply the
words in accordance with their plain meaning: to "create[]" a condi-
tion or situation, or a "risk," that leads to harm. 227 The court thus rea-
soned that by failing to adopt and implement security measures, the
school officials originally caused a condition or situation "of total in-
security" at the school which led to "foreseeable harmful conse-
quences" (i.e., the "invasion and fatal attack on Robinson by the re-
turning trio of violent students") .228
 Moreover, the court determined
that by failing to deter the "known and imminent threat" that the at-
tackers posed once they entered the school, the school officials exacer-
bated the condition of insecurity that they had created, "thereby ma-
terially contributing to the circumstances" that led to the to the
harmful consequences. 229
 According to the court, the failure of the
225 See id. at 849; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 371-1 (1998); see also supra note 7.
224 See Brum, 690 N.E.2d at 849.
225 See id. at 850-51. The Appeals Court's reversal of judgment included both the
plaintiff's NITCA claim as well as the plaintiffs wrongful death claim—which the court
held was dependent upon the town's asserted liability under the MTCA. See id, at 847 11.4.
In addition, the court held that the school's failure to act did not amount to the requisite
threats, intimidation or coercion required to give rise to a claim under the Massachusetts
Civil Rights Act, and did not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 851-52.
m See id. at 850.
227 See id
221 See id.
229 See Brum, 690 N.E.2d at 850-51. In her brief, the plaintiff rejected Justice
O'Connor's articulation of the "originally caused by" language in his Cyran concurrence,
finding that it "exclude[d] all failures to act," and was thus inconsistent with the "inherent
implication" of § 10(j) which provided that "a failure to act to prevent or diminish the
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school to act in either instance was an original cause of the harm inso-
far as it "created" the risk of harm that came to pass. 23°
In a footnote to the Brum I opinion, the court explicitly rejected
the town's argument that because the school merely failed to prevent
or mitigate the harm, as opposed to actively causing the harm, the
public duty rule had no application. 2m Quoting Whitney, the 1977 case
in which the court vacated a decision denying recovery to a student
injured at school and announced its intention to abolish the sover-
eign immunity doctrine, the court stated that municipal liability
"should not be influenced by the finite distinctions drawn in [the]
cases [involving misfeasance-nonfeasance analysis], distinctions which
have no real connection with sound reasoning or policy." 2" There-
fore, the court reasoned that the applicability of § 10(j) in Brum /did
not hinge upon the misfeasance/nonfeasance analysis involving pas-
sive versus active involvement in the harmful consequences that came
to pass.2" Rather, the court determined that § 10(0's applicability
harmful consequences of a condition or situation • • • that is originally caused by the public
employer is not excluded by the Act." Brief/Appendix for Appellant at 35-36, Blum (No.
96-P-687) (emphasis added). The plaintiff suggested that because neither the statute nor
case law defined "originally caused," the words should be interpreted in light of their plain
meaning. See id. at 35. According to Blades Law Dictionary, the plaintiff argued, "original" is
defined as "first in order," and thus, the public employer's act or failure to act need only
be the first cause—not "the only cause, the primary cause or the proximate cause." Id. at
35, Thus, the plaintiff concluded that the failure of the school to take appropriate security
measures, and to respond to a known threat, was the first, original cause of Robinson's
murder because "Nile entire scenario, possibly even including the morning's altercation
that led to the murder, could have been avoided if non-students were not permitted in the
school and if the school had effective procedures to follow to prevent violence and to stop
the escalation of disagreements into violence." Id. at 35.
23° See Brum, 690 N.E. 2d at 850-51. In addition to its analysis of § 10(j) 's plain mean-
ing, the court based its interpretation of the provision on the holdings of several other
cases—all of which were decided on grounds other than § 10(j). See id. at 850. The court
reasoned that under Irwin, the policy behind the MTCA—to abrogate sovereign immu-
nity—favored private compensation for persons injured by public entities. See id. (discuss-
ing Irwin, 467 N.E.2d at 1308). Additionally, the court relied on Mullins v. Pine Manor Col-
lege, which identified the duty of a private college to protect students against the criminal
acts of third parties and which recognized deficient security as a potential factor in causing
the risk of harm that comes to pass; Board of Education u School Committee, which defined
the municipal obligation to enforce school attendance; and Doe u Superintendent, which
linked this obligation with the obligation to provide a safe and secure environment in
which children can learn. See id. at 850 (discussing Doe v. Superintendent of Schs., 653
N.E.2d 1088, 1096 (Mass, 1995); Board of Educ. v. School Comm., 612 N.E.2d 666, 669-70
(Mass. 1993); Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331, 334-36, 338-39, 341142
(Mass. 1983)).
231
 See id. at 851 n.11.
532 Id. (quoting Whitney, 366 N.E.2d at 1218).
233 See id.
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rested on whether the public employees' action or inaction created
the risk; in other words, whether the public employees' failure to in-
stitute security measures in violation of § 37H "made possible" the
harmful consequences that came to pass and whether the public em-
ployees' action or failure to act, after the attackers had entered the
building, "brought about or contributed" to those consequences. 234
The court thus concluded that § 10(j) did not bar the plaintiff's claim
based on the school's failure to institute adequate security measures
and the school officials' failure to deter the youths from entering the
school because those failures constituted risk-creating conduct. 235
234 See id. at 851 11.11. By contrast, the town argued that in light of Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Cyran, in order for the school to have originally caused the harmful condi-
tion or situation, the school must have actively created the risk of harm that came to
pass—as opposed to merely failing to prevent or mitigate such harm. See Brief of Defen-
dants-Appellees at 23-24, Brunt v. Town of Dartmouth, 690 N.E.2d 844 (Mass. App. Ct.
1998) (No. 96-P-687). Because there was no evidence that the town or its employees origi-
nally caused the "escalating tensions between at least two (2) groups of students, which
ultimately led to Jason Robinson's death," the town concluded, it could not be held liable
under § 10(j). Id. In support of this proposition, the town relied on Bonnie W, where the
court held that § 10(j) barred the plaintiffs claim based on the failure of a parole officer
to supervise properly a parolee who subsequently assaulted the plaintiff because the
officer's conduct constituted "a failure to act." Id. at 24. The Appeals Court rejected this
argument without discussion, stating that the holding of Bonnie W "does not support the
defendants' analysis of [the case]." Brunt, 690 N.E.2d at 851 11.11.
235
 See Brunt, 690 N.E.2d at 850-51. The Massachusetts Appeals Court also addressed
the issue of whether the school's failure to institute security measures (as distinct from the
school officials' failure to deter the youths once inside the building) was protected from
liability by the discretionary function exception in § 10(b). See id. at 849. The Brum court
held that insofar as § 37H required school districts to publish policies containing "stan-
dards and procedures to assure school building security and safety of students and school
personnel," the school's failure to adopt or implement any security policies, procedures, or
safeguards—beyond the posting of a "No Trespassing" sign near the front door of the
school—was not a discretionary function under the first part of the Stoller test, and thus
was not immunized by § 10(b). Id.; see also supra note 49. By contrast, the town, echoing the
holding of the Massachusetts Superior Court, argued that although § 37H mandated the
promulgation and publication of safety standards and procedures, the statute did not
mandate "the nature and extent" of those policies. See Brum, 690 N.E.2d at 849 n.8; Brief of
Defendants-Appellees at 25, Brum (No. 96-P-687). Thus, although the school did not have
discretion to do nothing, the town argued that the school did have discretion to gauge the
adequacy of those policies that were in fact implemented. See Brief of Defendants-
Appellees at 25, Brum (No. 96-P.687). According to the town, then, the school's determi-
nation of what security measures to implement constituted discretionary conduct involving
policy-making under the Stoller test, and was thereby immunized by § 10(b). See id; see also
supra note 49.
In light of the potential liability facing towns like Dartmouth for noncompliance with
§ 37H, Massachusetts school officials and other interested parties now refer to § 37H as the
"Dartmouth Policy"
235 See Brum, 690 N.E.2d at 849-50.
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kass attacked the majority for bas-
ing its decision not on the language of § 10(j), but on public policy
considerations favoring private compensation for harms inflicted by
third parties "or other extraneous causes . . . that competent public
action might have prevented."2s6 According to justice Kass, it was the
task of the Legislature—not the court—to resolve such public policy
questions and that in this instance, where a student was killed by
third-party attackers, "the Legislature ha [d] done so unmistakably." 2"
The Justice reasoned implicitly that under § 10(j), liability should be
imposed only insofar as the public employer originally caused the
harmful consequences.238 Therefore, because "[n]o school official
stabbed Robinson to death," but rather, the school officials merely
failed to prevent the killing, the Justice concluded that the school
officials' conduct fell squarely within the exclusionary language of
§ 10(j).2"
In addition to citing the absence of any affirmative action on the
part of the school officials in support of immunity for the school, Jus-
tice Kass also argued that the Legislature's inclusion of the phrase
"violent or tortious conduct of a third person"—conspicuously absent
from the original draft of the MTCA amendments—indicated an in-
tent to exclude the type of claim brought by the plaintiff in Brum /.240
The Justice asserted that because Robinson's death was originally
caused by the violent acts of third parties, the school was explicitly
excluded under § 10(j). 241 Finding the language of § 10(j) unambi-
guous, Justice Kass concluded that the majority's analysis was nothing
short of "judicial nullification of a legislative act." 242
"8 See id. at 852.
237 Id.
238 See id.
239 Id. Justice Kass added that by employing such 'convoluted reasoning" and tortured
analysis to circumscribe the applicability of § 10(j), the majority had effected a regrettable
turnaround in public duty case law--"return[ing] the courts to making the sort of hide-
fensible distinctions that Jean W lamented and that gave rise to the 1993 amendments in
the first place." Id.
24° See 690 N.E.2d at 852 (Kass, J., dissenting); Glannon, supra note 54, app. at 32.
24 ' See Bruin, 690 N.E.2d at 852 (Kass, J., dissenting).
242 See id.
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B. The Supreme judicial Court's Treatment
In 1999, in Brum II, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the
Massachusetts Appeals Court. 243 The court stated that the issue in
Brum II, whether the school officials' failure to implement proper se-
curity measures and to otherwise deter the intruders originally caused
the condition or situation that led to Robinson's death, presented an
"interpretive quagmire," and cited for support § 10 (Fs inconsistent
application by superior court judges. 244 The court also acknowledged
that the Supreme Judicial Court had never directly addressed the
meaning of "originally caused by," specifically at issue in Brum H.245
Turning to the "convoluted and ambiguous" language of § 10(j),
the court reasoned that the principle purpose of § 10(j) was to pro-
vide public employers with a substantial measure of immunity from
liability arising out of a public employee's failure to prevent or dimin-
ish "certain harmful consequences."246 The only exception to this
broad immunity, the court determined, was where the condition or
situation giving rise to such consequences was "originally caused by
the public employer."247 In addition, by interpreting the "including
the violent or tortious conduct of a third person" clause—in harmony
with proper grammar and common sense—to modify the noun "con-
sequences," and not the words "condition or situation," the court rea-
soned that violent or tortious third-party conduct was not a condition
or situation but was rather a harmful consequence. 248 The court thus
determined that § 10(j) immunized public employers from all harm-
ful consequences befalling a plaintiff, including the consequence of
violent or tortious third party conduct, except where the employee
originally caused the condition or situation leading to those harmful
circumstances 249
243 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1155. In a companion case to Brum II, in King u Common-
wealth, the court held that neither the commonwealth of Massachusetts nor the Middlesex
District Attorney's Office was liable for the death of the plaintiff's decedent by a third
party who was released from custody on his own recognizance pursuant to an agreement
with the District Attorney's Office because the judicial officer, not the named parties, was
ultimately responsible for the third party's release. See id. at 1149, 1151. Finding no proxi-
mate causation, the coti•t never reached the issue of whether § 10(j) was applicable. See id.
at 1151.




243 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153; see also supra note 9.
249 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153.
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The court next applied this interpretation of § 10(j) to the facts
'of Brum 11.250 The court, echoing the arguments of the plaintiff, de-
termined that "the killers' acts or the death of their victim" were "the
harmful consequences," and, implicitly adopting the appeals court's
reasoning, further determined that the "injury-causing condition of
physical insecurity" was the condition or situation that led to such
consequences.251 Reasoning that the failure to secure the school and
to deter the intruders constituted a "neglect of duty" of protection
and that this neglect of duty was in fact "a failure to act to prevent or
diminish" harm, the court held that the school officials' conduct did
not originally cause the condition or situation that led to harm. 252
 Cit-
ing Kass's dissent in Brum, the court reasoned that although the
school officials might have prevented the killing, their failure to pre-
vent it was in the "excluded category" of § 10(j).253 Indeed, to recast
the school's failure to prevent the killing as an original cause of the
harmful condition or situation, the court added, would undermine
the principal purpose of the provision, which was to immunize "act(s)
or failure[s] to act to prevent," and would allow the exception to im-
munity to swallow the rule. 254 The Court further stated that it would be
hard put to find any example of a condition leading to a harmful con-
sequence, where the condition was originally caused by the public
employer versus being brought about by the public employer's failure
to prevent the condition. 255
In contrast to the policy interests that the Massachusetts Appeals
Court invoked to support the broad application of public tort liability
under § 10(j), the Brum II court relied upon Justice O'Connor's con-
currence in Cyran as the most likely interpretation of § 10(j), thus
supporting public immunity where the school merely "failed to pre-
vent or mitigate" the harmful condition or situation. 256 The court also
relied on the circumstances giving rise to § 10 this enactment for
support, concluding that, in the wake of Jean W, § 10(j) was a statu-
tory codification of the public duty rule, "intended to provide some





254 See Brum, 704 N.E.24 at 1153.
"5 See id.
250 See id. at 1154.
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employers."257
 In light of this legislative intent, the court reasoned
that it should avoid interpreting the provision "so broadly as to en-
compass the remotest causation and to preclude immunity in nearly
all circumstances."258
 As further support for its holding, the Brum II
court likened the failure of school officials to secure the school and to
apprehend the intruders with the parole officer's failure to properly
supervise the third-party parolee in Bonnie W and to the police
officers' failure to protect the storeowner in Lawrence.259 The court
observed that in each case, the actions of third parties originally
caused the plaintiffs' injuries; the defendants, on the other hand,
never acted at all, and thus were not liable for failing to prevent the
harm.26° By contrast, the court determined that the school's failure to
act was unlike the parole officer's negligent recommendation of the
parolee in Bonnie W because the parole officer's conduct constituted
an "affirmative act" that gave the parolee access to the trailer and thus
caused .the harm.261
In the final footnote to its opinion, the majority stated that it was
"in complete sympathy with the concurrence's observations that it is
unfortunate that school officials should escape all legal accountability
for their failure to protect the children under their supervision." 262
Despite the unsettling results of immunizing the town, the majority
believed that it would "distort the general regime of § 1 0(j)" for the
court to interpret the provision to give rise to liability in Brum H.263
Indeed, because § 10(j) applied to all public employers and in a wide
range of circumstances, the court left the task of changing the law ex-
plicitly to the Legislature.264
 Thus, unwilling to undermine the princi-
pal purpose of § 10(j) by imposing liability for inaction, the court
concluded that § 10(j) barred that plaintiff's claim based on the
school's failure to act to prevent harm. 265
257 Id.
259 Id.
259 See Brunt, 704 N.E.2d at 1155.
26° See id.
2,61 See id.
262 Id. at 1162 11.17.
263 See id.
26► See Brzim, '704 N.E.2d at 1162 n.17.
265 See id. at 1155. The Supreme Judicial Court also addressed the issue of whether the
public employees' failure to institute security meastues was protected from liability by
§ 10(b)'s discretionary function exception. See id. at 1152. The court determined that if
the school had in fact failed to adopt any security measures at all, in violation of § 37H,
claims based on this failure would not be barred by § 10(b). See id. Because the suit was
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hi a powerfully-worded concurrence, Justice Ireland, joined by
Justices Abrams and Marshall, agreed with the decision, but suggested
that the Legislature respond to the "unfortunate" result by changing
the law.266 Justice Ireland argued that the decision compelled by
§ 10(j) was wrong from a public policy perspective because regardless
of who or what caused harm to a student on school property, "parents
reasonably should be able to expect that the schools to which they
entrust their children will take reasonable steps to protect their chil-
dren from harm when, as here, the school officials are put on notice
that the children are or may well be in jeopardy.”267 In addition to
parents' reasonable assumptions about the safety of their children,
the Justice suggested that the Legislature was of the view that schools
were responsible to protect students, as demonstrated by its passage of
§ 3711 requiring standards and procedures assuring school building
security and the safety of students and school personne1.268 The secu-
rity measures mandated by the statute, the Justice added, could rea-
sonably be interpreted to protect students against any harm, regard-
less of who caused it.269
Justice Ireland argued that a duty of protection should apply
where a school official has advance notice of the risk of harm and
where the officials show deliberate indifference toward that risk by
failing to take any action to prevent it. 270 Repeating the facts of the
case, Justice Ireland emphasized that the school officials took no ac-
tion to prevent the risk of harm despite notice of a prior altercation
between several students and the assailants, and notice of threats of
retaliation.271 In addition, when several school officials witnessed the
assailants enter the school, the officials took no action to prevent the
risk of harm.272 In fact, the only measures taken to prevent harm, the
Justice continued, consisted of a "No Trespassing" sign that directed
visitors to the school office. 273 The Justice added that although school
barred by § 10(j), however, the court declined to consider whether the school's "No Tres-
passing" sign directing visitors to the school office constituted a security measure. See id.
lit addition, the court also rejected the plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. See id. at 1156-62.
206 See id. at 1162-63 (Ireland, J., concurring).
2" Id. at 1162.
268 See id. at 1163.
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officials are not absolute guarantors of students' safety, they should
"be expected to take reasonable measures to protect children when
they have advance notice of danger" and that it is up to the Legisla-
ture to impose such a duty on school districts.274
IV. REMEDYING SECTION 10(j) ' s INTERPRETIVE QUAGMIRE AND
CURING ITS HARSH RESULTS
A. Bruin II 's Reverberations
Brum II marks the first time that the Supreme Judicial Court has
attempted to address the ambiguity plaguing § 10(j), and its decision
leaves much to be desired.275 In fact, although it reversed the appeals
court decision holding the town liable, the Supreme Judicial Court's
reasoning in Brum II is as profoundly dissatisfying, unsettling and ul-
timately ambiguous as the appeals court's reasoning in Brum 1.276 In-
deed, in its attempt to clarify the language and intent of § 10(j) once
and for all, the Bruin II court reduced § 10(j) to a mere act/failure-to-
act inquiry, failing to appreciate the fine distinctions made by the
provision with regard to creation of risk and perpetuating an over-
simplified statutory interpretation for lower courts to follow. 277 As a
274 Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1163 (Ireland, J., concurring).
275 See Brum v. Town of Dartmouth, 704 N.E.2d 1147, 1153 (Mass. 1999); see, e.g., Bon-
nie W. v. Commonwealth, 643 N.E.2d 424, 426-27 (Mass. 1994) (finding that § 10(j) barred
claim without discussing meaning of "originally caused by"); Pallazola v. Town of Foxbor-
ough, 640 N.E.2d 460, 461-62 (Mass. 1994)(holding the same); Carleton v. Town of
Framingham, 640 N.E.2d 452, 456 u.7 (Mass. 1994) (finding that because § 10(h) barred
claim, court did not need to resolve meaning of "originally caused by").
276 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153; Brum v. Town of Dartmouth, 690 N.E.2d 844, 850-52
(Mass. App. Ct. 1998), reu'd, 704 N.E.2d 1147 (Mass. 1999). Brum was wrongly decided by
the Massachusetts Appeals Court. See Brum, 690 N.E.2d at 852 (Kass, J., dissenting). The
appeals court's flawed interpretation of § 10(j) was a regrettable regression into the same
tortured analyses that defined the court's public duty jurisprudence prior to the passage of
the 1993 amendments, thus nullifying § 10(j). See id. (Kass, J., dissenting). Moreover, by
concluding that the town of Dartmouth could be held liable for failing to institute proper
security measures and to deter third-party attackers, the appeals court's decision threat-
ened to impose an affirmative duty upon Massachusetts public schools to protect students.
See id. at 850-51.
277 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153-55. My contention is that the Brum H court's ac-
tion/inaction analysis is not equivalent to the misfeasance/nonfeasance analysis articu-
lated in Onofrio and subsequent cases. Indeed, although a misfeasance/nonfeasance analy-
sis necessarily involves a determination of whether a person acted or failed to act, and
although a public employer should be held liable for an employee's negligent acts and
should not be held liable for an employee's complete failure to act, the results of a pure
action/inaction analysis can be misleading. Thus, a proper misfeasance/nonfeasance
analysis, as will be demonstrated below by the "three-step analysis," should also involve
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result, § 10(j) remains an "interpretive quagmire," engulfing public
duty jurisprudence in a morass of ambiguity. 278 In the wake of Brzon II,
important public policy questions continue to plague § 10(j), de-
manding that a clear judicial interpretation be made on behalf of "the
[c] ommonwealth and other 'public employers' who must evaluate,
settle or otherwise litigate [MTCA] claims" and whose perception of
the ambiguity in the law may have a "chilling effect" upon their ability
to provide important public services; "the citizens of the
[c]ommonwealth whose tax dollars ultimately pay judgments under
[the MTC.A]"; "injured litigants who must determine whether com-
pensation for their injuries is barred as a matter of law"; and public
employees whose decision to act or not act is informed by their un-
derstanding of the duty owed to students. 279
B. Defining the Plain Language of Section 10(j)
Painting with broad brush strokes, the Brum II court's decision
ignores or misunderstands critical elements set out in § 10(0's plain
language, namely, the creation of the risk. 280 Because the true mean-
ing of § 10(j) remains unclear and will continue to elude courts in
the future, § 10(j)'s plain language warrants closer examination.
What follows is a suggested interpretation of the plain language of
§ 10(j), including a discussion of the phrases: (1) "act or failure to act
consideration for the creation of the risk. See Ono ► io, 562 N.E.2d at 1344-45; Glannon,
supra note 54, at 18.
In most cases, an action/inaction analysis yields the same result as an inquiry into
creation of the riSk, thus making the distinction irrelevant. For instance, where a housing
authority fails to supervise a guard who subsequently attacks a tenant, or where a police
officer fails to monitor a public function at which a fight subsequently ensues. a court's
determination that the employees failed to act or that the employees did not materially
contribute to the risk of harm will lead to the same finding of immunity. In other cases,
however, a mere action/inaction analysis may be a poor substitute for a more searching
inquiry into the creation of the risk, thus making the distinction an extremely important
one. For instance, where a public service agency fails to warn a homeowner that a tenant—
placed in the home by the agency—has a history of starting fires, an action/inaction analy-
sis may provide immunity to the agency for failing to inform the homeowner of the ten-
ant's history, while an inquiry into the creation of the risk will more accurately reveal that
the agency in fact created the risk by actively placing the tenant in the home. For this rea-
son, a misfeasance/nonfeasance analysis based solely upon an inquiry into action and
inaction is incomplete in its reasoning. and may well be incorrect in its holding.
27B See id. at 1153.
279 See Commonwealth of Massachusetts' Amicus Statement in Support of the Allow-
ance of the Town of Dartmouth's Application for Further Appellate Review, at 1-2, Brum
v. Town of Dartmouth, 690 N.E.2d 844 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (No. 96-P-687).
280 See Bruns, 704 N.E.2d at 1155.
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to prevent or diminish"; (2) "originally caused by"; (3) "condition or
situation"; and (4) "harmful consequences."
First, contrary to Whitney's and the MTCA's across-the-board im-
position of liability for negligent acts and omissions, § 1 Oth's initial
proposition is that public tort liability will not apply to any claim
based upon the public employer's (or employee's) act to prevent or
diminish harmful consequences, or failure to act to prevent or dimin-
ish harmful consequences, unless exceptional criteria apply."' The
"act" and "failure to act" language is derived from the common law
public duty rule that the Supreme Judicial Court first employed in
Dinsky to relieve public employers from civil liability newly imposed by
the MTCA's abrogation of the sovereign immunity doctrine. 282 Under
that rule, a public employer was not liable for failing to perform the
public duty (here, the duty to prevent or diminish harmful conse-
quences), or for inadequately or erroneously performing the public
duty, unless exceptional criteria applied. 285 Therefore, the inclusion of
this language presumes that immunity will apply to public employers,
unless the presumption is rebutted by referenCe to an exception (i.e.,
where the public employer or employee originally causes a condition
or situation that leads to harm) contained within the provision 284
Second, under § 10(j), a claimed act or failure to act is not ac-
tionable unless the harmful condition or situation is "originally
caused by" the public employer or employee. 285 The phrase "originally
caused by" is the most elusive and controversial language contained in
§ 1 0 0).288 Until Bruin I and Bruin II, both the Supreme Judicial Court
and the Massachusetts Appeals Court had expressly declined to con-
sider the meaning of "originally caused by. "287
 In light of the enduring
ambiguity surrounding the phrase and the inconsistency with which
the words have recently been interpreted, it is useful to chart the in-
tended meaning of the phrase.288
Under traditional negligence analysis, a plaintiff proves causation
by shOwing that the defendant's breach of a duty of a reasonable,
281 See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 258, § 10(j) (1998).
282 See Dinsky, 438 N.E.2d at 55-56; see also Jean W, 610 N.E.2d at 316 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1356-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
283 See Doses & HAYDEN, supra note 24, at 405 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLY
ON TORTS § 300, at 385-86 (D. Avery Haggard ed., 4th ed. 1932)).
284 See MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 258, § 10(j).
283 Id.
284 Id.; see Glamion, supra note 54, at 26-27.
287 See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 205-65 and accompanying text.
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prudent person in fact caused the harm that came to pass, and more
specifically, that the defendant's breach of a duty was the proximate
cause of that harm. 289 By contrast, § 10(j) does not look to whether a
public employer breached the duty of a reasonable, prudent person
because under § 10(j), the public employer's alleged act or failure to
act to prevent or diminish harm implicates a distinctly public duty.29°
In addition, § 10(j) looks not to whether the public employer caused
the harmful consequence, but to whether the employer caused the
condition that led to that harm.291 Thus, § 10(j) necessarily demands
an entirely different inquiry into causation than does traditional neg-
ligence because the former does not implicate the actual merits of a
negligence suit, but rather involves a threshold inquiry into whether a
suit may in fact be brought.292 For these reasons, the meaning of
"originally caused by" does not rest in common law tort analysis.293
Rather, the "originally caused by" phrase derives its meaning from Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurrence in Cyran (in which the phrase first ap-
peared), the decision by the committee formulating § 10(j) to use
this language, the evolution of public duty case law that gave rise to
the phrase and the writings of Professor Joseph W. Minton, who par-
ticipated in the drafting of § 10(j) and whose writings have greatly
informed courts' interpretation of the provision.294
Section 10( j)'s "originally caused by" language is adapted from
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Cyran. 293 In that opinion, Justice
O'Connor stated that the "traditional [common law] public duty rule"
distinguished between a public employee's originally causing a condi-
tion or situation that led to the plaintiffs harm and a plaintiffs being
"harmed by a condition or situation which was not originally caused
by the public employee, and is attributable to the employee only in the
sense that the employee failed to prevent or mitigate it."296 The traditional
public duty rule, Justice O'Connor further stated, applied only in the
latter case. 297
The meaning ofJustice O'Connor's phrase "originally caused by,"
then, relies upon a negative inference: original cause is not the failure
2" See DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 24, at 126, 180-81, 202-03.
2" See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(j); see also Dinsky, 438 N.E.2d at 55-56.
291 See MASS. GE14. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(j).
292 See id.
293 See id.
294 See infra notes 295-319 and accompanying text.
2" See Cyr-an, 597 N.E.2d at 1357, 1360 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
299 See id. at 1360.
2" See id.
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to prevent or mitigate an injury-causing condition or situation 2 98
Thus, original cause is the act of creating the injury-causing condition
or situation.299 To illustrate the meaning of this phrase, Justice
O'Connor suggested an example used in Onofrio, involving a police
officer's negligent driving of a cruiser that caused injury." ) Justice
O'Connor reasoned implicitly that in such a case, the public duty rule
would not be applicable because the police officer did not merely fail
to prevent or mitigate the injury-causing condition or situation, but
was rather an active participant—and in fact the sole participant—in
creating that condition or situation. 301 In his concurrence in Jean W,
Justice O'Connor further defined the meaning of the phrase by re-
peating the public duty rule's distinction between "originally
caus[ing] " the harm and "fail [ing] to act to rectify a situation not cre-
ated by the [public] employee," and by explicitly comparing the pa-
rolee's originally causing harm in Jean W to the employee's "taking
action that exposed [another] to risk" in Onofrio. 392 Moreover, Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Jean W explicitly premised the applica-
tion of the traditional public duty rule—and thus' , the "originally
caused by" phrase—upon the distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance, and between acts and omissions.") Based upon this
time-honored distinction of "long duration," Justice O'Connor stated
that there was to be "no question about it" that the phrase "originally
caused by" presumed the misfeasance of a public employee and only
misfeasance could overcome the application of the public duty rule. 394
Significantly, by invoking the Supreme Judicial Court's prior ptib-
lic duty jurisprudence in defining the meaning of "originally caused
by," Justice O'Connor implicitly recognized that the misfeasance re-
quired to trigger public tort liability necessarily involved a public em-
ployee's creation of the risk." 5 Indeed, despite the confusion engen-
dered by the Onofrio line of cases, Justice O'Connor understood those
cases to rely upon an inquiry into the creation of risk: where the pub-
lic employer had actively created the risk of harm that came to pass
298 See id.
299 See id.
388 See Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1360 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Onofrio, 562
N.E.2d at 1344).
581 See id.
3°2 Seefean W, 610 N.E.2d at 316-17 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See id. at 318.
soy See id.
30S See Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1360 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see, e.g., Mamulski, 570
N.E.2d at 1029; Onofrio, 562 N.E.2d at 1344-45.
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(misfeasance), the public duty rule did not apply, and where the pub-
lic employer merely failed to prevent an independent, third-party risk
of harm from coming to pass (nonfeasance), the public duty rule did
apply.306 Justice O'Connor's articulation of the "originally caused by"
phrase in Cyran was therefore an attempt to bring the public duty rule
into conformance with this inquiry.307 Furthermore, by adopting both
Justice O'Connor's words as well as his reasoning in drafting § 10(j),
the committee formulating the provision necessarily intended to pre-
serve this inquiry into the creation of the risk.308 Thus, from its com-
mon law origins to its codification by statute, the phrase "originally
caused by" implies the creation of risk. 309
In addition to Justice O'Connor's explication of the "originally
caused by" phrase and its codification by statute, the writings of Jo-
seph Glannon, a legal scholar and member of the committee that
formulated § 10(j), have been widely cited by courts for their elucida-
tion of § 10(j) 's language and are thus instructive in determining the
meaning of the "originally caused by" phrase.m Consistent with Jus-
tice O'Connor's and the committee's understanding of the phrase,
Glannon notes that the provision's inclusion of the words "originally
caused by" requires some creation of the risk--"something more than
the pure failure to alleviate private harm. . . . some involvement of a
public employee in creating the initial injury-causing scenario, not
simply a failure to respond adequately after it arises." 311 Glannon fur-
ther states that § 10(j), by adopting O'Connor's exact language, "em-
bodies the distinction . . . between publicly-created risk"—that is, a
public employer's "creating a risk which causes harm to another" and
306 See Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1360 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see, e.g., Mamulski, 570
N.E.2d at 1029; Onofria, 562 N.E.2d at 1344-45.
30 See Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1357, 1360 (O'Connor, J.. concurring).
" See id.; Memorandum, supra note 106, at 2 (stating that § 10(j) "bars liability claims
based on the negligent failure of a governmental entity to prevent or diminish harm
caused by a condition or risk not initially caused by the govenunental entity").
" See Cyran, 597 N.E.2d at 1357, 1360 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Memorandum, su-
pra note, at 2.
310 See Glannon, supra note 54, at 25-27.
311 Id. at 26. In his explication of §10(j)'s language, Glannon distinguishes between
the meaning of the provision's "originally caused by" phrase and "the common law distinc-
tion between misfeasance/nonfeasance," arguing that in certain cases, § 10( j) will impose
liability where the common law would not. See irl. at 27. Nevertheless, if one accepts my
contention that the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction relied upon by Justice O'Connor
implicitly requires an inquiry into the creation of risk, § 10( j) and the common law should
yield identical results, thus making Glannon's distinction immaterial to § 10( j)'s "origi-
nal[] cause[]" inquiry. See Cyran, 597 N.E.2d" at 1360 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Glannon,
supra note 54, at 27.
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"the fail[ure] to prevent harm from a private [independent source of]
risk."312
 In other words, Glannon adds, § 10(j) should not bar recov-
ery if the public employee "materially contributed" to the creation of
the risk that led to injury. 813
Third, insofar as "originally caused by" refers to the employer or
employee's creation of the risk of harm, it follows that the "condition
or situation" is the actual risk of harm that comes to pass and thus
leads to harmful consequences.314
 The Legislature's insertion of the
clause, "including the violent or tortious conduct of a third person,"
insofar as it modifies the phrase "a condition or situation," bolsters
the view that a condition or situation is the risk of harm that comes to
pass, such as a person's wrongful or otherwise "risky" conduct and
from which harmful consequences necessarily arise. 818 Furthermore,
this definition of the phrase is supported by a memorandum that
Senator Jacques of the Senate Judiciary Committee circulated prior to
the passage of § 10(j), in which the words "condition or situation"
and "risk" were used interchangeably. 316
Filially, the American Heritage Dictionary defines "consequence"
as Is] omething that logically or naturally follows from an action or
condition."317 Because the plain meaning of "consequence" presumes
a precipitating action or condition, a harmful consequence is that
which follows certain risky actions or conditions; it does not however,
"include the precipitating action or condition itself."318 Under § 10(j),
"harmful consequences" should thus be understood as the logical re-
sults arising from a preceding risky "condition or situation" or as the
natural product of the risk of harm that came to pass.319
C. Application of Section 10(j)'s Plain Language to Public Duty
Jurisprudence: The Three-Step Analysis
Assuming that a plaintiff's claim against a public employer alleges
a negligent act or failure to act to prevent or diminish harmful conse-
3" Id. at 25-26.
3" Id. at 27.
314 See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 258, § 10(j); Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at
6-8, Bruin► v. Town of Dartmouth. 704 N.E.2d 1147 (Mass. 1999) (No. SJC-07744).
3" See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 258, § 10(j); Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at
8, Bruin (No. SJC-07744).
316 See Memorandum, supra note 106, at 2.
317 Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6, Bruin (No. SJC-07744) (quoting
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2d College ed. 1982)).
318 see id.
319 See id.
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quences, thus bringing it within the scope of § 10(j), the court must
next determine whether public duty immunity will apply or whether
the public employer is excepted from immunity for creating the risk
that came to pass.32° As demonstrated by the prior attempts of both
the Supreme Judicial Court and the Massachusetts Appeals Court to
avoid defining § 10(j) altogether and more recently by the Massachu-
setts Appeals Court's completely erroneous interpretation of § 1 0 (j)
in Brunt /and the Supreme Judicial Court's insufficient and dissatisfy
-ing explanation of § 1 0(j) in Brunt II, § 10(0's plain language pres
ents a formidable obstacle to making this reasoned determination. 321
Correct and consistent results depend upon a proper and thorough
reading of § 10(j) by the courts, for whom the following three-step
analysis should serve as a guide: (1) determine the "harmful conse-
quences" (i.e., death, physical injury, emotional distress, property
damage); (2) determine the risk of harm ("condition or situation")
that produced the harmful consequences; and (3) determine whether
the public employer or employee's alleged wrongful acts or inaction
created ("originally caused") that risk of harm that came to pass. 322 If
a public employee originally causes a condition or situation that leads
to a harmful consequence, the public employer should be held liable
under § 10(j); if not, the public employer should not be held liable. 323
This three-step analysis, although not explicit in either public duty
jurisprudence or in current legal scholarship, is consistent with both
prior public duty cases interpreting the common law public duty rule
as well as recent cases decided under § 10(j) . 324 Because these cases
necessarily inform the future application of § 10(j), an analysis dem-
onstrating § 10(j)'s consistent application to public duty case law will
serve as a useful guide for determining the future liability of public
employers under § 10( j) . 325
It is instructive to apply the proposed three-step analysis. to prior
public duty cases because § 10(j) is the legislative embodiment of the
common law public duty rule and should yield results that are consis-
tent with that rule. 326 Under Onofrio, where an employee of the De-
partment of Mental Health placed a client in the plaintiff's home
32° See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10 (j). n
321 See supra notes 178-265 and accompuning text.
322 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(j).
323 See id.; see also supra note 310 and accompanying text.
324 See infra notes 326-442 and accompanying text.
325 See infra notes 326-442 and accompanyilig text.
326 See Carleton, 640 N.E.2d at 455.
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without first warning the plaintiff of the client's proclivity for starting
fires and where the court refused to apply the public duty rule,
§ 10(j) would probably not apply insofar as the public employee
"[took] action that exposed [the homeowner] to risk." 327
 Applying
§ 10( j)'s three-step analysis to Onofrio demonstrates that: (1) the
plaintiffs home was damaged by a fire set by the client; (2) the risk of
harm that came to pass was the tenant's starting a fire in the home;
and (3) the employee created the risk of harm by actually placing the
client—who had a propensity for starting fires—within the home
without any warning to the homeowner. 328
 In Onofrio, the employee
did not merely fail to prevent the risk of harm which came to pass, but
rather, the employee's conduct materially contributed to the risk of
harm that came to pass; but for the employee's placement of the cli-
ent, the plaintiff would not have been exposed to the risk of the fire
that came to pass.329
In Mamulski, where the court refused to apply the public duty
rule, § 10(j) would probably not apply to bar liability, insofar as: (1) a
motorist was killed in a car accident; (2) the risk of harm that came to
pass was a motorist's failure to stop at an intersection and collision
with an oncoming vehicle; and (3) the town created the risk by failing
to replace the stop sign that it knew to be missing. 330 Although the
town technically "failed" to replace the stop sign, this does not mean
that such conduct amounted to "a failure to prevent or mitigate" the
risk of harm that came to pass."' Indeed, the risk of harm would not
have existed but for the town's conduct and thus the town would be
liable for exposing the motorist to that risk. 332
On the other hand, in the case of A.L., where a probationer
abused young children and where the court refused to apply the pub-
lic duty rule because a "special relationship" existed between the town
and the children, § 10(j) would likely bar liability. 333 In A.L., (1) the
plaintiffs were injured as a result of abuse, (2) the risk of harm that
came to pass was the probationer's taking advantage of his proximity
to the plaintiffs and perpetrating such abuse, and (3) the town did
not create this risk, but rather, the town merely failed to prevent the
327 See Onofrio, 562 N.E.2d at 1343-45; Glannon, supra note 54, at 30-31.
"3 See Onopio, 562 N.E.2d at 1343-45.
329
	 id. at 1344-45; Glannon, supra note 54, at 30-31.
33°
 See Matnulski, 570 N.E.2d at 1028-29.
331 See id. at 1029.
332 See id.
333
 See A.L., 521 N.E.2d at 1019, 1021-23; Glannon, supra note 54, at 31.
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risk by improperly supervising the probationer's place of employ-
ment.554 Indeed, the nature and extent of the town's involvement With
the probationer's abuse of the plaintiffs was insufficient to constitute a
source or root of that risk of harm. 535 Regrettably, but for the employ-
ees' conduct, the plaintiffs would still have been exposed to the risk of
harm."6 By contrast, if the public employees had placed the proba-
tioner in proximity to the children, such involvement would have
constituted a creation of the risk, exposing the plaintiffs to a risk of
assault that did not previously exist.
Despite the fact that before Bruin I and Bruin II neither the Mas-
sachusetts Appeals Court nor the Supreme Judicial Court had explic-
itly interpreted the language of § 10(j), their decisions to apply and to
not apply public duty immunity are nonetheless consistent with the
three-step analysis under § 10( j)."7 In 1994, in Pallazola, the Supreme
Judicial Court held that where a football fan was injured by a goal post
carried by other fans, § 10(j) barred the fan's claims against the town
based on the town's failure to provide sufficient police protection and
the to prevent the unlawful removal from the stadium of a portion of
the aluminum goal post."8 Although the Pallazola court did not
definitively interpret the language of § 10(j) before applying public
duty immunity (stating merely that the "sort" of claim asserted against
the town was foreclosed by § 10(j)), the court's holding comports
with the three-step analysis."9 In Pallazola, (1) the plaintiff was injured
by an electrified goal post, (2) the risk of harm that came to pass was
the crowd's removing and carrying a portion of the unwieldy goal
post that came into contact with a high voltage power line, and (3)
the failure of the town to provide sufficient police protection or to
prevent the removal of the goal post in no way "materially contrib-
uted" to the risk of harm that came to pass.34° Indeed, the police
officer's conduct was not a source or root of the crowd's risky behav-
ior, but rather, it was a failure to prevent that risk of harm from com-
ing to fruition.mi
334 See A.L., 521 N.E.2d at 1019, 1021-23; Glannon, supra note 54, at 31.
335 See AL., 521 N.E.2d at 1021-23.
"6 See id.
3" See infra notes 338-356.
333
	
Pallazola, 640 N.E.2d at 461-62.
339 See id. at 462.
$40 See id at 461-62.
341 See id. at 461-62; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 9-11, Bruin v. Town
of Dartmouth, 704 N.E.2d 1147 (Mass. 1999) (No. W-07744).
438	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 41:383
Likewise, in Bonnie W, the Supreme Judicial Court held that
where the plaintiff was assaulted by a parolee, § 10(j) barred the
plaintiffs claim of negligent supervision, but did not bar the plain-
tiff's claim of negligent recommendation and misrepresentation.m2
Despite its lack of elaboration on the language of § 10(j), the court's
reasoning is nonetheless consistent with the three-step analysis. 343
Where the court held that § 1 0(j) barred the parole officer's negli-
gent supervision of the parolee: (1) the plaintiff suffered injury as a
result of an assault perpetrated against her in her mobile home; (2)
the risk of harm that came to pass was the parolee's taking advantage
of his employee status, gaining access to and assaulting the plaintiff;
and (3) the failure of the parole officer to supervise properly the pa-
rolee did not materially contribute to the risk of assault of the plain-
tiff. 344
 Indeed, if the parole officer never met with the parolee at all,
the plaintiff would still have been exposed to the risk of assault; the
parolee's own actions and intentions created the risk of harm that
came to pass and the parole officer merely failed to prevent it. On
the other hand, consistent with the court's analysis, § 10(j) did not
bar the parole officer's affirmative efforts in support of the parolee's
continued employment, insofar as those acts materially contributed to
the risk of assault by actively maintaining the parolee's employment
status. 346
 This latter point is an extremely important one, for by disal-
lowing the application of § 1 0 (j) immunity to the parole officer's neg-
ligent recommendation and misrepresentation in Bonnie W, the court
enabled a public employer to be held liable in cases where the plain-
tiff is injured by the conduct of a third party. 347 The test, consequently,
is whether the defendant's conduct was separate in time and place
from the third party's tortious conduct, or whether the defendant's
conduct was so inextricably linked to the third party's conduct as to
have materially contributed to (originally caused) the risk of harm
that came to pass.548
In Lawrence, the Supreme Judicial Court stated in dicta that
where a storeowner was assaulted by a third party outside of his store,
342 See Bonnie W, 643 N.E.2d at 426-27.
113 See id.
3" See id. at 426.
345 See id.
546 See id. at 426-27.
547 See Bonnie W, 643 N.E.2d at 426-27.
548 See id.; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 9-11, Brum v. Town of Dart-
mouth, 704 N.E.2d 1147 (Mass. 1999) (No. SJC-07744).
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§ 10(j) barred the storeowiiers' claim against the city based upon the
failure of the police to protect him from attack. 349 Although the court
again did not engage in any significant statutory interpretation of
§ 10(j), the court's holding is consistent with the three-step analysis
insofar as: (1) the plaintiff was shot multiple times; (2) the risk of
harm that came to pass was the brutal attack perpetrated by a third-
party; and (3) the police officer's failure to protect the plaintiff, de-
spite knowledge of the risk of assault (the plaintiff had warned the
police of such an attack), did not create the risk of attack that came to
pass."° Indeed, the third party's murderous intent to keep the plain-
tiff from testifying against him at a grand jury hearing created the risk
of attack that came to pass; the officer's failure to act was independent
of that risk.35' If, however, the police had purposefully "arranged" with
the third party to be absent from the crime scene on the night of the
attack, this conduct would have materially contributed to the risk of
assault by affirmatively "placing" the third party in a position to effect
that risk of harm.
Furthermore, in a recent Massachusetts Appeals Court decision
decided under § 10(j), the appeals court's reasoning is supported by
the proposed three-step analysis." 2 In Allen, where a student was fa-
tally stabbed by a second student during an altercation in school, the
court denied the city's motion for summary judgement, holding that
§ 10(j), in the absence of further evidence, did not bar the plaintiff's
claim against the city based on the school employee's failure to prop-
erly "handle" the students" Although the court did not explicitly in-
terpret the language of § 10(j), the court's holding squares with
§ 10(j)'s three-step analysis: (1) the plaintiff's decedent was stabbed
and killed; (2) the risk of harm that came to pass was the stabbing of
the decedent by a second student as the culmination of an altercation;
and (3) because the town did not provide sufficient evidence to the
contrary, the town's failure to take special precautions in enrolling
the student and in providing for the safety of others within the
school—in view of the student's known history of weapons violations
at other schools—materially contributed to the risk of harm that came
349 See Lawrence, 664 N.E.2d at 2-3.
$50 See id.
351 See id.
552 See Allen, 693 N.E.2d at 700-01.
353 See id. at 700.
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to pass.354
 This is a close case, but insofar as the school knew of the
threat posed by the student and yet did not consider this threat when
making the decision to enroll the student and to plan for safety, the
school's "failure" to handle the student properly was analogous to
affirmatively "placing" the student in the position to effect The risk of
harm.355
 Indeed, by actively bringing the student into the school
without consideration of his background—much like the parole
officer's negligent recommendation of the parolee's continued em-
ployment in Bonnie W—the school exposed the plaintiff to a risk of
attack that did not previously exist. 356
In contrast to its decisions in recent public duty cases, the Su-
preme Judicial Court in Brum //misconstrues the language of § 10(j),
and in so doing, renders much of § 1 j)'s language a nullity. 357 By
adopting much of the lower court's confused analysis, the court
reaches the "correct" result by the wrong method of analysis, thus cir-
cumventing the fine distinctions made by § 10(j) at the expense of a
clear and final interpretation of the provision. 358
 What remains is a
statutory provision stripped of distinction, a mere shell of the former
§ 10(j), and reduced to an inquiry into whether the public employee
acted or failed to act.359
Implicitly incorporating nearly all of the appeals court's reason-
ing, the Brum II court disagreed with the appeals court only as to its
354 See id. at 700-01. The only evidence that the school provided was the text of the
school's "Code of Discipline" that banned possession of weapons on school premises and
described the sanctions for such infractions. See id. Although this may have been sufficient
in other cases, the court stated that in this case, where the student's history of violence
made him a significant threat, the school needed to produce specific evidence with regard
to its handling of the student: See id. Such evidence might include a deposition or affidavit
explaining "how the school considered and acted upon the 'placement' questions" (the
decision to enroll, to integrate, to oversee and to supervise the student), as well as the
"security questions" (the existing safety measures and employees' methods of confronting
problems of violence). See id.
"5 See id.
S58 See id. If the school had provided information that specifically addressed its consid-
eration of the placement and enrollment of the student, § 1001 would likely have barred
liability See id. Under that scenario, the court would probably have determined that the
school did not create the risk of harm because it took special measures to minimize the
risk of harm inherent in their enrollment of the student. See id. Without such information,
this case is closely analogous to the ''negligent hiring" cases—leaving the court no choice
but to hold the public employer liable for exposing others to a risk of harm because the
school did not take reasonable measures to ensure safety See id.
357 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153-55.
S58 See id.
"9 See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
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characterization of original cause. 560 According to the Supreme Judi-
cial Court, the "killers' acts" (presumably, the invasion and attack on
Robinson) and "the death of their victim" were the harmful conse-
quences.561 The condition or situation that led to the harm was a state
of "physical insecurity" within the school, or arguably, was left
undefined because it was irrelevant to the court's analysis. 562 Finally,
although the court never stated what the original cause was, the court
explained that the original cause was not the "neglect of duty" by the
school's employees who both failed to adopt and implement security
measures in the first instance as required under § 37H, and subse-
quently failed to implement interventionist security measures to pre-
vent the attackers from entering the schoo1.565 The court reasoned
that to hold the school liable for neglect of a duty or a failure to act,
as did the appeals court, would undermine the very basis of § 10(j),
which was to immunize public employers for failures to act. 564
Despite the correctness of its holding, Brum Ifs analysis wholly
contradicted the three-step analysis both explicitly and implicitly ar-
ticulated in prior cases decided under the COMMOrl law public duty
rule and § 10(j), and thus churned the already muddied waters sur-
rounding the plain language of § 10(j). 565 Without a clear precedent
for deciding subsequent public duty cases involving public schools,
lower courts have been left to sink or swim. 566 Given Brum Its incon-
sistent holding and uncertain implications, several important ques-
tions emerge, neatly coinciding with the specific junctures posited by
§ 10(j)'s three-step analysis. 567
Question one: What were Brum Ifs "harmful consequences"? De-
spite the court's conclusions to the contrary, the harmful conse-
quence in Brum //was Robinson's fatal injury—not the killers' acts. 568
To answer this question, however, it is first necessary to inquire into
the court's interpretation of "harmful consequences."569 As men-
tioned above, harmful consequences refer to the final injury or inju-
560 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1152-55.
%I Sec id. at 1153.
362 See id. at 1152-53.
365 See id.
564 See id. at 1153.
365 See Brum, 740 N.E.2d at 1153-55; see also supra notes 322-56.
366 See Brum, 740 N.E.2d at 1153-55; see also supra notes 322-56.
567 See Brum, 740 N.E.2d at 1153-55; see also supra notes 322-56.
5615 See Brunt, 704 N.E.2d at 1153; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6, Brun
(No. SJC-07744).
369 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153.
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ries that flow from an immediately prior condition or situation (risk
of harm that came to pass) . 370 They do not implicate the risk of harm
itselfsn In Brum II, the harmful consequences that the school failed
to prevent or diminish were the injury and death of Robinson—not
the fatal injury and the invasion and attack that gave rise to that fatal
injury.372 This point bears repeating: the invasion and attack on
Robinson were not harmful consequences—they were the risk of
harm that came to pass.373
Rather than separating the harmful consequence (the fatal in-
jury) from the risk of harm that gave rise to that consequence (the
invasion and attack), the court, echoing the arguments of the plain-
tiff, merges these two distinct junctures into one, stating that "either
the killers' acts or the death of their victim were 'the harmful conse-
quences.'"374 But does not the third-party invasion and attack consti-
tute a condition or situation giving rise to harm, rather than a conse-
quence • itself? 375 The court did not think so and supported this
proposition by determining that § 1 0(D's clause—"including the vio-
lent or tortious conduct of a third person"—could not grammatically
or logically modify the words "condition or situation," and therefore
must necessarily modify the words "harmful consequences." 376 Thus,
because the youths' invasion and attack on Robinson was without
question violent or tortious conduct, the court summarily concluded
that such conduct was a harmful consequence. 577
By combining the killers' acts with the fruition of those acts, the
fatal injury of Robinson becomes encapsulated within the killers' at-
tack itself, as both are rendered indivisible parts of the whole conse-
quence.378 And herein lies the rub: the harmful consequences of a
risk of harm that comes to pass must be kept separate from that risk
of harm, for the two junctures involve two entirely different inquir-
ies. 379
 To say that the invasion and the resultant death were but one
379 See supra notes 317-18 and accompanying text.
371 See supra notes 317-18 and accompanying text.
372 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153; Supplemelital Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6, Bruin
(No. SJC-07744).
373 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6-7,
Brim (No. SJC-07744).
374 See Brim, 704 N.E.2d at 1153.
375 See id.; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6-7, Brum (No. SJC.07744).
376 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153.
577 See id.
375 See id.; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6-7, Brum (No. SJC-07744).
379 See Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6-7. Brum (No. SJC.07744).
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consequence ignores the fact that one followed "logically or naturally"
from the other, and renders the distinction between the two meaning-
less.") This distinction is a crucial one, for by collapsing "risk of
harm" into "harmful consequence," the court relegates the true and
final harmful consequence (the fatal injury) to an ancillary status that
is presumed to exist but only in communion with the other harmful
consequence (the invasion and attack) . 381
In other words, where the invasion and attack is deemed the
harmful consequence of a preceding risk of harm, the resultant injury
or death of the victim is understood to be only a part of that conse-
quence, as opposed to a separate and independent harmful conse-
quence of the invasion and attack.382 It is the distinction between a
motorist's involvement in a car collision, without determining what
harm, if an was suffered by the motorist; the distinction between a
person's lighting a fire without inquiring into the damages caused by
the fire; or the distinction between a parolee's violation of the terms
of his parole by committing abuse, without inquiring into who was
injured and the extent of the injury. Harmful consequences encom-
pass the damages sustained, not the risk that gives rise to those dam-
ages. Thus, in answer to the first question, the harmful conse-
quences contemplated by § 10(j) were indeed the injury and death of
Robinson.384
Question two: What was Brum Ifs "condition or situation"? Al-
though the court implicitly determined that a condition of "physical
insecurity" led to Robinson's death, the harmful condition or situa-
tion in Brum II was in fact the attackers' violent conduct. 385
 Indeed,
after lumping the invasion and attack together with the fatal injury
that resulted from the attack, the court arguably makes a second con-
ceptual leap in deciding that the condition or situation that gave rise
to the harmful consequences was that of "physical insecurity" against
38° See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6, Brum
(No. SJC-07744).
i81 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6-7,
Brum (No. SJC-07744).
382 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6-7,
Brum (No. SJC,07744).
383 See Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6-7, Brum (No. SJC-07744).
184 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6-7,
Brum (No. SJC-07744).
383 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1152; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6-7,
Brum (No. SJC-07744).
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interlopers at the school. 388
 Although the court never explicitly
defined the particular condition or situation that gave rise to the
harmful consequences, it did cite the lower court's mention of "the
initial injury-causing condition of physical insecurity," and thus im-
plicitly adopted that definition in its own analysis."7
 Moreover, this
implicit adoption of school insecurity as the harmful condition or
situation is more plausible because the court explicitly ruled out the
killers' invasion and attack as a possible condition or situation. 388
Presuming that the court intended to adopt the appeals court's
definition of condition as "physical insecurity," the court's reasoning
falls apart.s" Indeed, under the three-step analysis, it is difficult to see
how insecurity could be considered the risk of harm that came to
pass.") The school's insecurity did not itself lead to harmful conse-
quences of injury or death, but merely preceded in time the risk of
harmful conduct (invasion and attack) that subsequently followed."'
Section 1 0(j)'s statutory language supports this view by modifying the
words "condition or situation" with the phrase "including the violent
386 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1152.
387 See id. (quoting Brim, 690 N.E.2d at 850).
sse See id. Whether or not the court intended to adopt the appeals court's definition of
"condition" as "physical insecurity" is not altogether certain, See id. at 1153. Indeed, an
alternative reading of the case reveals that the court may have intended to delete the
"condition or situation" clause from its application of § 10(j) altogether. See Id. As men-
tioned above, the court never explicitly defined the condition or situation in the context
of the Brum If case, and according to the court's decision, § 10(j) did not require the court
to do so. See id. Indeed, the court determined that the "principle purpose" of § 10(j) was
to confer immunity on public employees for harm that conies about as a result of their
(employees'] 'failure to prevent' the 'violent or tortious conduct of a third person,'"
and to restrict the conferrence of immunity "in the presence of the clause which removes
that immunity where the 'harmful consequences' were 'originally caused by the public
employer.'" Id. Conspicuously absent from the court's interpretation was any mention of
condition or situation, and this is an extremely important deficiency. See Brum, 704 N.E.2d
at 1153. If the Legislature had intended the ''condition or situation" clause to be read out
of § 10(j), it would not have included the clause in the first place, but would rather have
stipulated that employers are not liable for the failure to prevent harmful consequences
unless they originally caused those consequences. See id. The Legislature did not say this, how-
ever, and instead required that immunity be "removed" where an employer originally
causes the condition or situation that, in turn, gives rise to harm. See id. Thus, by arguably
reading "condition or situation" out of the provision, the court makes the imposition of
liability solely dependent upon a public employee's creation of harmful consequences, as




391 See Braun, 704 N.E.2d at 1152; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 7, Brum
(No. SJC-07744).
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or tortious conduct of a third person."592 Thus, § 10(j) contemplates
that the condition or situation that gives rise to harmful consequences
will likely consist of some sort of conduct (i.e., an employee's
affirmative conduct, a third party's intervening conduct, an injured
party's contributory conduct, or even a fire's destructive "conduct")
that comes to pass and not from peripheral and attenuated risks. (i.e.,
insecurity) that preceded the harmful conduct. 593
Contrary to the Supreme Judicial Court's analysis, because the
tortious conduct of a third party is most reasonably thought of as con-
stituting a risk of harm with potential and independent harmful con-
sequences, as opposed to being itself a mere harmful consequence of
some precedent risk, the "tortious conduct" phrase most "logically"
constitutes a "condition or situation." 394 In addition, because the "tor-
tious conduct" phrase follows immediately after the words "condition
or situation" and not after the word "consequences," the phrase also
"grammatically" constitutes a "condition or situation."395 Further-
more, if conduct were indeed a consequence, as the court maintains,
then what exactly would be the harm arising out of that conse-
quence?396 Section 10(j) says nothing about subsidiary consequences.
Therefore, because the "tortious conduct" phrase most reasonably
modifies the words "condition or situation" and because the phrase
contemplates a risk of harmful conduct, the court's condition of
"physical insecurity" fails for lack of any basis of conduct.397
Thus, rather than identifying the interlopers' actual conduct of
invasion and attack as the risk of harm that came to pass, the court
instead traced all preceding risks in connect-the-dot fashion back to
the proverbial "first" risk and deemed that risk to be the risk of harm
that came to pass—regardless of its attenuation from the actual injury
392 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(j)(1998); see Supplemental Brief of Defendant-
Appellee at 8, Brum (No. SJG07744); see supra notes 314-16 and accompanyh kg text.
59s See Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 8, Brum (No. SJC-07744).
s94 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(j); Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at
8, Brum (No. SJC-07744). The Brum court, on the other hand, determined that the "tor-
dot's conduct"' phrase "must modify the noun 'consequences,' rather than the nearer
nouns 'condition' or 'situation,' because conduct cannot grammatically or logically consti-
tute 'a condition or situation.'" Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153.
59s See MASS. GEN. LAWS C11. 258, § 10(j); see also JOHN C. HODGES & MARY E. WHITTEN,
HARBRACE COLLEGE HANDROOK 279 (5''' ed. 1962) (stating that "phrases should be placed
near the words they modify").
396 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153.
397 See id. at 1152-53; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 8, Brum (No. SJC-
07744).
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and death. 598
 Accordingly, the court implicitly determined that
"physical insecurity" was the risk of harm that came to pass and that
presumably led to the interlopers invading the school wielding weap-
ons and the attack on Robinson and the fatal injuries sustained by
Robinson.599
 Such an interpretation substitutes attenuated risks for
the risk of harm that actually came to pass and that gave rise to the
harmful consequences." Indeed, under this analysis, one could hy-
pothetically say that the risk of harm that led to the death of Robin-
son was Robinson's own involvement in fights with the alleged inter-
lopers that very morning, the previous evening or during the prior
week; the interlopers' acquisition of weapons; or the school employ-
ees' security training. 401 Under the court's analysis, any preceding risk
in the chain of events leading up to the harmful consequences is free
game for pinning the tail of liability" Had the court correctly ap-
plied § 100), they would have concluded that the risk of harm that
came to pass in Brum II was clearly the interloper? actual invasion and
attack on Robinson."' Thus, in answer to the second question, it is
evident that the condition of such violent conduct—not the condition
of insecurity—constituted the "condition or situation" that led to
harmful consequences."
Question three: What was Bruin II's "original cause"? Although
the court completely failed to specify what originally caused the risk
of harm, Brum II's original cause was the murderous intent of the at-
tackers." The court's analysis of original cause is misguided not only
because of what it states, but more importantly, because of what it
does not state." The court reasoned in the negative that the school's
failure to implement a school security policy and to apprehend the
perpetrators on the day of the murder did not originally cause the
398 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1152-53; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 7,
Bruin (No. SJC-07744).
.359
 See Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 7, Brum (No. SJC-07744).
40 See Brunt, 704 N.E.2d at 1152-53; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 7,
Brunt (No. SJC-07744).
401
 See Bruin, 704 N.E.2d at 1152-53; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 8
11.1, Brum (No. SJC-07744).
402 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1152-53; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 13,
Brunt (No. SJC-07744) .
483 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1152-53; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6-7,
Brunt (No. SJC-07744).
4°4 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1152-53; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 6-7,
Bruhn (No. SJC-07744).
493 See Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 8-9, Brum (No. SJC-07744).
406 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1152-55.
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harm, but never discussed what exactly was the original cause of
harm.4°7 Rather, the court summarily concluded that the "principal
thrust" of § 10(j) was to immunize public employers for failing to pre-
vent harrn.408 Thus, by characterizing the school officials' conduct as a
"neglect of duty"—defined as "a failure to act to prevent or diminish
[harm] "—liability did not apply. 409
Although the court correctly 'identified the legislative intent be-
hind § 10(j), which was to provide "some substantial measure of im-
munity from tort liability to government employers," the court went
too far in protecting public employers. 410 Absent from the court's
analysis is any significant discussion of the creation of the risk, that is,
whether or not the school officials! conduct in fact created the condi-
tion or situation of "physical insecurity" that led to the invasion, attack
and death.411 All that is stated is that the school neglected a duty and
thus failed to prevent Robinson's death.412 By premising original cau-
sation solely upon an action/inaction distinction, however, without
regard for the creation of the risk of harm, the court shrank the
three-step analysis .articulated by § 10(j) into a one-step analysis:
whether or not the public employee acted. 413 Indeed, the court
"remedied" the ambiguity in § W(j) 's plain language by oversimplify-
ing the provision. 414 It may be argued that because a person's failure
to act necessarily precludes that person from originally causing harm,
thus' eliminating the need for further inquiry into risk of harm and its
consequences, only one step is needed or required by § 10(j). This
assumption, however, fails on two separate grounds.
The first and most obvious reason that original causation analysis
must involve more than simply an action/inaction inquiry is that
where a public employee is found, to have acted, that does not neces-
sarily mean that § 10(j) immunity should not apply. Indeed, the court
must scrutinize whether the public employee's conduct materially
contributed to the harm that came to pass, or whether the employee's
acts were so attenuated as to render the conduct a mere failure to
prevent the risk of harm.415 Second, although it is true that a coin-
407 See id.
408 See id. at 1154-55.
409 See id. at 1153.
410 see
 id. at 1154.
411 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1152-53.
412 See id. at 1153,1155.
413 See supra note 277 and accompanying, text.
414 See supra note 277 and accompanying , text.
415 See Minton, supra note 54, at 26-27. '
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plete failure to act would necessarily preclude a person from origi-
nally causing harm and would thus constitute a failure to prevent the
risk of harm, a court cannot be certain that a public employee failed
to act unless it first looks to the other steps in the analysis—to the risk
of harm and its consequences.'1° Without any inquiry into the risk of
harm that came to pass, the characterization of an employee's con-
duct as either "action" or "inaction" is relative, and is thus left entirely
up to the discretion and whim of the court.417 In the words of Chief
Justice Liacos, who cautioned against an action/inaction distinction
in public duty cases: "[a] standard so flexible cannot provide the cer-
tainty and predictability essential to the law."'"
Despite these warnings, the Brum H court, in its attempt to nar-
rowly define the circumstances in which a public employer would be
held liable, enabled public employees' future actions to be recast as
harmless inaction by use of the action/inaction distinction.' 19
 Al-
though the court derived the correct result in Brum II because the
school officials did not create the risk of harm, the danger inherent in
the court's action/inaction distinction is clearly evident in a host of
other scenarios, such as: (1) where a school institutes a policy provid-
ing that a school's floors will be cleaned while students are in class
and neglects to put out a "Caution: Wet Floor" sign; (2) where a town
changes a two-way street into a one-way street and forgets to post a
"One-way" sign; or (3) where a public agency employs a security guard
at a housing complex and neglects to check the guard's criminal rec-
ord. Despite the action taken in the above examples, the danger is
that under the court's reasoning in Brum II, the court may recharac-
terize any one of these circumstances as inaction—a "neglect of
duty"—and thus, as a failure to prevent or diminish a risk of harm. 2°
416
 See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
417 See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
416 Jean W, 610 N.E.2d at 312 (Liacos, CI, concurring).
419 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1152-55.
42°
 See id. at 1153, 1155. Following the Brum decision, the plaintiff's lawyer, James E Ri-
ley, Jr., implied that by enabling public employers to recharacterize their conduct as a fail-
ure to act to prevent harm in order to shield themselves from liability, the court's decision
would virtually wipe out all potential claims against public employers involving violent or
tortious third party conduct. See Ric Oliveira, SJC Clears Dartmouth in '93 Student Murder;
STANDARD TIMES, Jan. 22, 1999, at A2. Mr. Riley further stated that "[a]s a result of this
decision, you cannot sue a school official when your child gets injured or killed on the
school property in any situation other than if the teacher or school official themselves in
the perpetrator of the injury: Id. By contrast, the town of Dartmouth's attorney, John J.
Davis, agreed with the action/inaction distinction articulated by the court, stating that, If
you were to rule the other way, there's a whole lot of other cases that would come down
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Fearing that a broad interpretation of original cause would allow
every failure to prevent harm to be recast as originally causing a
harmful condition, "encompass[ing] the remotest causation and pre-
clud[ing] immunity in nearly all circumstances," the court thus sa-
crificed a clear interpretation of § 10(j) and its intricacies for an in-
terpretation based solely upon action and inaction. 421 'In the wake of
Brum II, what is left of § 10(j) is a streamlined, albeit more straight-
forward, shell of the former rule: if public employers do not act, they
are not liable.422
Because the court's analysis of original causation stopped short
with the finding that the school officials failed to act, the court never
properly addressed why the school officials' neglect of duty was not an
original cause of the harmful condition or situation.425 A proper
analysis under § 10(j) must answer this question not by showing that
the public employee did not act, but rather, by showing that the pub-
lic employee did not create the risk. 424 In its brief, the town of Dart-
mouth argued that the source or root of the violent and tortious at-
tack that led to Robinson's death was the assailants' murderous
intent.425 Indeed, it was this murderous intent of retaliation that cre-
ated the risk of invasion and attack that came to pass. 426 Although the
school failed to secure the building properly, the school's failure to
act "was not a source from which the assailants' murderous intent in-
cepted."427 Indeed, as demonstrated by the negligent enrollment of
the student in Allen, in order for a public employer to be held liable,
the school officials' conduct must have materially contributed—along
with the third party's conduct—to produce the risk of harm that came
to pass.428 Thus, had the principal of the school summoned the three
the pike ... and I don't know if the Legislature wants that to happen." Id. He added, "If
the elected representatives in this state want to hold public officials accountable for inci-
dents like this one—a madman conies in and causes harm to another on the property—
that's up to the Legislature. It's not in the law right now." Id. According to Mr. Davis, the
court's decision preserved a workable scheme of public tort liability, and avoided the slip-
pery slope that would enable "[t]he shove on the playground [to] become a case." Id.
421 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1154.
422 See id. at 1155.
423 See id. at 1153.
424 See id,
423 See Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 8-9, Brum (No. SJC-07744).
428 See id. at 8.
427 Id. at 8-9.
428 See Allen. 693 N.E.2d at'700-01. In the three cases decided by the Supreme Judicial
Court under § 100, all of which involved an intervening third party, the court imposed
public immunity in all but one case—where the public employee affirmatively and unlaw-
fully aided a third party in maintaining employment status in proximity to the plaintiff. See
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youths to the school for a meeting or enrolled the youths in the
school despite knowledge of their murderous intent and thereafter a
violent altercation had caused injury to the plaintiff, §1 j) immunity
would have been inapplicable. In that scenario, the public employees
by "placing" the students in the school would have materially contrib-
uted to the risk of harm that came to pass: 129
Unlike the school officials' negligent enrollment in Allen, how-
ever, the school officials in Brunt II did not "place" the third party in
the position to effect the risk of harm. 43° In Brum H, the youths placed
themselves in the position to effect harm when they chose to invade
the school, thereby creating the risk. 431
 More specifically, in Allen, the
employees created the risk by actively bringing the third party into the
schoo1.452
 Were it not for the employee's negligent action, the third
parties would not likely have been there to effect the risk of harm in
the first place. 455
 The same cannot be said of the employees' inaction
in Bruin /km Because the employees did nothing to invite or deter
the interlopers, the third parties may, and just as easily may not, have
invaded the school and attacked Robinson: 135
 Thus, the school's lack
of security, although not making the attack any more difficult, did not
affirmatively make the attack any easier by placing the third parties in
the position to cause harm:156 In short, whereas the officials' conduct
in Allen was part and parcel of the risk that came to pass, the school
officials' failure to secure the school properly in Brunt II was
sufficiently removed from the violent attack that took place and could
hardly be said to have materially contributed to that attack. 437
 In fact,
much like the parole officer's failure to supervise the parolee prop-
erly in Bonnie W, the school officials' failure to provide security (of
Bonnie W, 643 N.E.2d at 426-27. Thus, where a third party is involved in injury to the
plaintiff, the plaintiff bears a heavy burden of showing that the public employee's conduct
"combined with the [third party's] conduct in producing the injury," and that without the
public employee's conduct, the third party could not reasonably have caused the injury.
Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 10-11, Brurn (No. SJC-07744).
429 See Glannon, supra note 54, at 459.
430 See A /len, 693 N.E.2d at 700-01.
See Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 8-9, Brurn (No. SJG07744).
432 See Allen, 693 N.E.2d at 700.
433 See id. at 700-01.




	 Allen, 693 N.E.2d at 700-01; Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 8-9,
Brunt (No. SJC-07744) .
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which supervision is but one type) merely preceded an intervening
and unconnected risk of harm that followed.438
As Justice Kass argued in his ringing dissent in Bruin I, In] o
school official stabbed Robinson to death" and thus "[i] t requires
convoluted reasoning to say . . . that the school authorities originally
caused the violent act of [the three youths]."439 Although the authori-
ties might have prevented the killing, the Justice correctly added that
it was the three interlopers alone that originally caused the invasion
and attack. 440 Therefore, under a proper three-step analysis, the court
should have concluded that: (1) Robinson's death was the harmful
consequence; (2) the risk of harm that came to pass was the attack
perpetrated against Robinson by the invading interlopers; and (3) the
school's failure to secure the school properly and apprehend the per-
petrators on the day of the murder did not originally cause the risk. 441
Thus, in answer to question three, the murderous intent of the three
interlopers—not any act or failure to act on the part of the school
officials—originally caused that risk. 442
D. The Harsh Law of Section 10(j)
Because of the confusion still surrounding § 10(j) in the wake of
Brum II, it is instructive to consider several hypothetiCal cases within
the school context and their likely outcomes under § 10(j). The sug-
gested resolutions of these hypotheticals illustrate the practical appli-
cation of § 10(j) in harmony with its plain language and legislative
intent. More importantly, these resolutions demonstrate § 1 0(j)'s
458 See Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 11-12, Brum (No. SJC-07744).
ass Brum, 690 N:E.2d at 852 (emphasis added).
44
 See id.
441 See Brunt, 704 N.E.2d at 1152-55.
442 See Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 8, Brunt (No. SJC-07744). Notwith-
standing Brum 'a oversimplified interpretation of § 10(j), recent lower court decisions
are consistent with the three-step analysis. See, e.g., Serra v. Franklin County. 713 N.E.2d
389 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (refusing to bar liability where correctional officers caused iron
gate to be pinned against plaintiff); Moores v. Callahan, 1999 WI.. 1295109 (Mass. Super.
Ct. 1999) (barring liability where Animal Control Officer returned dog to owner despite
knowledge of dog's propensity for violence, and where dog attacked plaintiff); Barret v.
Wachusett Reg'l Sch. Dist., 1999 WL 1025398 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1999) (refusing to bar li-
ability where teacher nominated handyman to assume responsibility of children at school-
organized overnight program, and where handyman verbally and physically abused chil-
dren); Bayles v. Love, 1999 WL 515627 (Mass. Super, Ct. 1999) (barring liability where
teacher failed to prevent student from assaulting another student, despite knowing or
having reason to know of student's intention to commit assault); Kent v. Commonwealth,
1999 WL 218509 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1999) (refusing to bar liability where commonwealth
negligently paroled inmate who subsequently injured plaintiff).
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practical effects on the lives of public employers, school officials, par-
ents and students.
In a hypothetical suggested by the town's counsel at oral argu-
ment, a town would most likely be liable for injury to a child struck by
a car on the way to school, if the school decided to start classes earlier
in the day while it was still dark and the darkness contributed to the
accident.443
 In that case, although the child was in fact struck by a
third-party driver, the town's decision to start classes in the dark mate-
rially contributed to the risk of a child being injured in the dark; but
for the town's decision, the child would not have been injured. 444 By
contrast, if the town started classes early and several area youths began
throwing rocks at the children attending school, the town would not
be liable for injury to the children because its decision did not mate-
rially contribute to the risk of students being injured by stones. In that
443 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Bruin v. Town of Dartmouth, 704 N.E.2d 1147 (Mass.
1999) (No. SJC-07744) (audio recording on file with Supreme Judicial Court); see also
Monica Allen, School Security Suit Unearths a Legal Surprise. Dartmouth Case Hinges On Law
that Didn't Exist in '93. STANDARD TIMES, No 3, 1998, at A2. In Brum II, the court sug-
gested that "[w]hat is needed is an example of a condition or situation leading to a harm-
ful consequence, where the condition was originally caused by the public employer but not
brought about by the.public employer's failure to prevent it." Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153; see
also supra note 254 and accompanying text. The above scenario provides one such exam-
ple. Even though § 10(j) would most likely not bar liability, however, § 10(b) discretionary
function immunity may be applicable.
"4 See Transcript of Oral' Argument, Brunt (No. SJC-07744). Likewise, the town may
also be liable if the school, without notice to students, changed the direction of traffic flow
in the school parking lot, and as a result, a student was hit by a bus. In that case, although
the child was in fact struck by a third party driver, the school's decision to change the
traffic pattern materially contributed to the risk of a student being injured. Another ex-
ample might include a school policy to clean floors during school hours, where a student
falls on a wet floor after a school employee fails to put out a "Caution: Wet Floor" sign. In
that case, the employee materially contributed to the risk of a student's falling and being
injured. Indeed, had the floors not been cleaned during school hours, the student would
not likely have fallen.
Noticeably absent from the above-mentioned examples is any intentional tortious ac-
tion on the part of a third party. This is not to say that § 10(j) excludes all claims against
public employers for harm inflicted by third parties. Indeed, § 10(j) should not shield
public employers from liability for the violent or tortious conduct of a third party that
arises from the negligent hiring of a teacher with a history of sexual abuse, or the negli-
gent enrollment of p student with a history of violent crimes. Nevertheless, the presence of
intentionally tortious third party conduct makes it much more difficult for the plaintiff to
establish public employees' material contribution to harm, and the Brunt II holding has
made it even more difficult. In fact, it remains to be seen whether the Brum //court's in-
terpretation of § 10(j) will enable plaintiffs to sue public employers based on violent or
tortious third party conduct at all, or whether the court will bar all such claims based on a
failure to act to prevent harm. See supra note 420.
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scenario, the youths—not the town—created the risk of harm that
came to pass.
In another hypothetical, the town's counsel suggested at oral ar-
gument that if a school principal created a policy stipulating that all
school doors must be locked and then forgot to lock them, and if an
interloper subsequently made his or her way into the school and at-
tacked and injured a student, the town would be liable for the stu-
dent's injury under § 10(j).` 45 The language and intent of § 10(j) do
not support such a conclusion. Indeed, under § 1 0 (j), in order for
liability to apply, the public employee must originally cause a condi-
tion or situation that leads to harmful consequences. Although the
principal failed to lock the doors in contravention of school policy,
this failure alone did not create the condition that led to the harm
any more than if the principal had failed to lock the doors without
ever having made such a policy in the first place. 447 In both scenarios,
the principal's failure to lock the doors merely coincided with the
murderous intent of the third party, and although it may have made
the invasion easier, it did not create the risk of injury.445 Thus, in this
case, an inquiry into the creation of the risk of harm leads not to the
initial failure of the principal to lock the door, but rather, to the third
party interloper's murderous intent. 449 Barring collusion on the part
of the school or some other affirmative action taken with regard to
the invasion and attack on the student., insecurity does not materially
contribute to murder, but violent attacks do.450
Professor Glannon offers an additional hypothetical, involving a
school official's negligent supervision of a playground during school
hours and the subsequent injury of one student by another student. 451
He argues that in this case, although "[title direct source of the harm
is the other child ... it cannot be said that this injury is 'attributable
to the employee only in the sense that the employee ... failed to pre-
vent or mitigate it.'"452 Glannon maintains that because "the child is
required to attend the school, and school officials have placed the
child in a situation which involves a risk of injury without taking ade-
5 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Brum (No. SJC-07744).
446 See RAM GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(j) (1998).
"7 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Brum (No. SJC-07744).
448 See id.
449 See id.
450 See supra notes 428-29 and accompanying text.
451 See Glannon, supra note 54, at 26-27.
452 Id. at 27.
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quate steps to protect him," § 10(j) should not apply because the pub-
lic einployee's negligent conduct materially contributed to producing
the injury.455
At the time of Glannon's writing, the Supreme Judicial Court had
not yet decided Bonnie W, and thus, Glannon did not have the benefit
of the Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of § 10(j) regarding
claims of negligent supervision. 454 Bonnie W establishes that a claim of
negligent supervision alone is generally insufficient to warrant a
finding of liability against public employers—especially where the
harm is caused by an intervening third party. 455 In this hypothetical,
the school official's failure to monitor the schoOl children adequately
did not create the risk of harm that came to pass—that risk of harm
was created by the other child's tortious conduct. 456
 Unless the school
official actively participated in creating the risk of harm to the child,
as where an official negligently seats a child in a swing or organizes a
dangerous game that results in injury to a child, the negligent super-
vision constitutes a mere failure to prevent harm and does not mate-
rially contribute to the risk of injury. 457
In a final hypothetical, plaintiff's counsel argued at oral argu-
ment that the school's failure to implement security measures and to
deter the known and imminent threat of three armed interlopers was
comparable to a school official seeing a grenade in a schoolyard
sandbox and failing to remove it.458 According to plaintiffs counsel,
liability must be imposed in either case under § 10(j).459 In contrast,
the town counsel's argued that under § 10(j), the town would not be
liable "even if [the school official] saw the grenade, failed to remove
it, and it exploded," so long as the school official did not actually
453 Id.
454 See Bonnie W, 643 N.E.2d at 426.
455 See id.
456 See Glannon, supra note 54, at 26-27.
457 See Bonnie W, 643 N.E.2d at 426. Indeed, In a footnote of its opinion, the Supreme
Judicial Court determined that Professor Glannon's suggestion that liability should be
applied in the "playground" hypothetical "perpetuate[di sonic of the confusion caused by
the statute." Bruin, 704 N.E.2d at 1154 n.10. The court added that such a scenario was not
readily distinguishable from other situations in which Glamton suggested that liability
should not be imposed, such as where a child is bitten by a rabid raccoon after a public
health director negligently delays in responding to reports of the raccoon. See id.
458 Transcript of Oral Argument, Bruin (No. SJC-07744); see also Allen, supra note 443,
at A2.
459 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Bruin (No. SIG-07744).
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place the grenade in the sandbox in the first place.' 60 Both the plain
language and legislative intent of § 10(j) favor the town's interpreta-
tion of the hypothetical because the school official did not cause the
grenade to be placed in the sandbox in the first place and thus did
not create the risk that presumably led to harm upon explosion of the
grenade.46I Rather, the school official failed to prevent the risk of
harm from coming to pass, which is specifically excluded from liability
under § 1 0(j).462 As dissatisfying as this result may be, the Legislature
did not wish to make public employers liable for the malicious acts of
third parties, for to do so would impose too great a burden on the
employers whose officers and employees are constantly in contact
with private individuals. 465
E. The Grenade with a Sign: A Suggested Exception to § 10(j)
Troubled by the sweeping immunity given to schools under
§ 10(j), as suggested by the town's response to the "grenade-in-the-
sandbox" hypothetical example at oral argument before the Supreme
Judicial Court, Justice Fried pressed the issue of when a town becomes
liable for school safety.464 Modifying the hypothetical slightly, Justice
Fried suggested that in addition to the grenade in the school sand-
box, a sign was attached to the grenade, reading: "This grenade will
go off in ten minutes."` 65 The Justice added that a school official read
the sign, saw the grenade and yet failed to act, at which time the gre-
nade exploded, causing harm to students.'" What result?
The town's counsel answered that the town would still not be li-
able, and according to § 10(j), the town was correct. 467 Because no
school official placed the grenade in the sandbox or otherwise mate-
rially contributed to its placement and subsequent explosion, the
school officials' indifference toward the grenade-with-sign constitutes
only a failure to prevent an independently-created risk of harm front
466 Allen, supra note 443, at A2; see Transcript of Oral Argument. Bruin {No. SJC.
07744).
461 See Transcript of Oral Argument. Bruin (No. SJC-07744).
462 See MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 258, § 10 (j) (1998).
462
 See id.
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coming to pass, despite the fact that the school official was on notice
of the risk of harm that came to pass. 468
Lurking behind Justice Fried's thankfully, farfetched hypothetical
are fundamental questions of foreseeability that go to the heart of the
Brum II case: what did the school know, if anything, about the im-
pending violence and what did the school do or fail to do in light of
such knowledge? 469
 In short, did the school officials at Dartmouth
High School "read the sign"? 4" These questions are irrelevant to
§ 10(j) analysis, which involves only a threshold determination of
whether or not a public employer originally caused the condition or
situation that led to harm.471
 Indeed, questions of foreseeability are
dealt with, if at all, only after the court has determined that § 10(j)
immunity is inapplicable. 472
 Thus, even if the risk of harm was in fact
foreseeable, so long as the public employer did not create the risk of
harm that came to pass, § 10(j) suggests that courts will never reach
the issue of foreseeability. 473
The Brum /court, however, suggested differently, concluding that
the town's foreseeability of the risk of harm and its failure to act in
light of that foreseeability, among other things, created the condition
that led to harm:" As mentioned above, such a decision marks a firm
departure from the language and spirit of § 10(j), and the legislative
intent to limit public tort liability, to provide predictable results
through litigation and to reach a careful balance between compensat-
ing injured plaintiffs and maintaining stable government. 475
 By bring-
ing foreseeability to bear on the application of the public duty rule
and by holding the town liable for a complete and utter failure to act,
the Brum /court destroyed the rule:" In light of the troubling resolu-
466 See id.
469 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Brum (No. SJC-07744).
476 See id.
471 See supra notes 170,291-93 and accompanying text.
472 See supra notes 170,291-93 and accompanying text.
473 See supra notes 170,291-93 and accompanying text.
474
 See Brunt, 690 N.E.2d at 847,850.
475 See supra note 276.
476 See Brunt, 690 N.E.2d at 850-51. If the mere foreseeability of harm triggers a duty of
protection, how far must school officials go to fulfill that duty and avoid liability? For ex-
ample, if a "No Trespassing" sign is insufficient to fulfill a school's duty of protection to a
student against foreseeable intruders, would not a locked door also be insufficient where
intruders break down the door, and would not a metal detector be insufficient where the
intruders wield wooden bats? Echoing this sentiment, an editorial opinion in a local news-
paper stated:
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don of the grenade-with-sign hypothetical under § 10(j), however,
perhaps the Brum I court was on to something by holding the school
liable for ail arguably foreseeable risk of harm, but merely ap-
proached it the wrong way.477 What § 10(j) needs is a new animus, a
new spirit that will enable liability to flow for harms resulting from
such indifference; if that dOes not work, perhaps the Legislature will
settle for something more mundane—a new exception. 478
In light of Brum Ifs resounding denial of liability, public duty ju-
risprudence and the public itself demand and deserve a new excep-
tion to § 10(j).479 Currently, where a school official is aware of a risk of
harm and does absolutely nothing to prevent that risk from coming to
pass, the public employer may not be held liable because the official
did not create the risk of harm. 480 This is a proper result under the
letter and intent of the provision, but as illustrated by the grenade-
with-sign hypothetical, it is not a particularly satisfying result. Despite
concern over unpredictable court interpretations and crippling
financial burdens on local governments that derive from an
affirmative duty of schools to protect, we want school officials to pro-
tect students from harm of which they are aware. In addition, despite
the importance of public tort immunity to the creative and efficient
provision of public services by public Servants, who can not possibly
prevent every attack nor dissuade every attacker, we do not want
school officials to act with indifference toward harm—we want them
to act. Thus, in addition to the four exceptions enumerated under
§ 10(j), the Legislature and the courts should consider a new excep-
tion, § 10(j) (5), which whould stipulate that § 10(j) shall not apply to
"any claim in which a public employer or any other person acting on
behalf of the public employer had actual notice`k 81 of the condition or
Of course we want children to be safe in schools. But safety is a relative thing.
Where is our level of comfort? Should schools be equipped with barricades,
security doors, cameras and guards? Is a receptionist with a remote-control
door lock enough? What about protecting students from each other inside
the school? Is a school liable when a bully punches out another student's
lights? Does a weapon need to be involved? ... The questions are endless.
It Won't Be Easy to Determine When Schools Are Safe Enough, STANDARD TIMES, Jan. 24,1999.
477
 See id.
478 See infra notes 479-503 and accompanying text.
4" See Brum, 704 N.13.2d at 1155.
48° See id.
481 "Actual notice" is distinguishable from principles of constructive notice and respon-
deat superior in which employers may be held liable for employee misconduct despite being
unaware of such conduct. The Supreme Court in Gebser u Lago Vista Independent School
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situation that led to harmful consequences, and acted in deliberate
indifference482
 to that condition or situation."483
This two-prong test for imposing liability, requiring (1) actual
notice and (2) deliberate indifference on the part of school officials,
is not new to the courts and has recently been applied to public em-
ployers of public schools in the Title IX context. 184 The two-prong test
District defended this distinction in the Title IX context, finding that As a general matter,
it does not appear that Congress contemplated unlimited recovery in damages against a
[public employer] where the [employer] is unaware of discrimination in its programs." See
524 U.S. 274, 285 (1998).
42
 The "deliberate indifference" standard, as suggested by the Court in Gebser, is a
higher standard than ordinary negligence because of the Court's concern that a lower
standard would enable a public employer to "be liable in damages not for its own official
decision but instead for its employees' independent actions." See 524 U.S. at 290•91. The
Seventh Circuit has defined the term "deliberate indifference" as conduct:
evidenced by either actual intent or reckless disregard. Although the term
"actual intent" is self-explanatory, reckless disregard is not.' A defendant acts
recklessly when he disregards a substantial risk of danger that either is known
to him or would be apparent to a reasonable person in his position. Reckless-
ness is characterized by highly unreasonable conduct or a gross departure
front ordinary care in a situation where a .
 high degree of danger is apparent.
The standard is an objective one. Although subjective unawareness of the risk
is no defense, the risk must be foreseeable. Indeed, risk is defined as a recog-
nizable danger of injury. The risk also must be substantial.
Gilbert, supra note 22, at 472-73 509 n.5 (quoting Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 339 (7th
Cu. 1985)). The deliberate indifference standard derives from Eighth Amendment pris-
oner cases such as Estelle u Gamble, where the Court held that in order to recover in a
§ 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that the State acted with deliberate indifference to a
prisoner's medical needs. See id. at 503 11.5. This standard continues to be used by the
Court in establishing § 1983 claims. See e.g., Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,104-06 (1976).
483 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287-93.
484 See id. In 1998, in Gebser, the United States Supreme Court held that a public school
district was not liable for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 (prohibiting sexual discrimination in federally funded
education programs), absent the school district's actual notice of, and deliberate indiffer-
ence toward, the teacher's misconduct. See id. at 292-93. Because of the contractual nature
of Title IX, "conditioning an offer of federal funding on a promise by the recipient [the
school] not to discriminate," and because of Title IX's enforcement scheme by which
Congress required agencies to put schools on notice before terminating federal funds, the
Court decided that the federally funded entity must have notice of its employees' discrimi-
nation before the Court will impose liability. See id. at 286-90. In addition, the court rea-
soned that where a school district is on actual notice of discrimination, the school district's
response to the violation nmst be one of "deliberate indifference"—"an official decision by
the recipient not to remedy the violation." See id. at 290. The Court in Gebser concluded
that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the first prong of the Title IX analysis because the plaintiff
could not show that any school official had actual notice of the teacher's misconduct. See
id. at 291-92. According to the Court, the only information pertaining to the teacher's
misconduct—a complaint made by the parents of other students, charging that the teacher
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is new, however, to Massachusetts public duty jurisprudence. 485 Still,
because the test preserves the limited liability of public employers
while enabling individual compensation in narrowly circumscribed
cases, the two-prong test provides a workable model for a new excep-
tion to the statutory public duty rule.486
Indeed, this exception to public tort immunity is exactly the type
of legislative solution demanded by Braun II's majority because it is
aimed at "achievf Mg] a satisfactory result" in the "special category" of
school violence cases, yet narrowly tailored to meet the "wide range of
circumstances" covered by the provision, including the police con-
text.487 Moreover, this exception mirrors the duty of protection that
Justice Ireland, in his Brum II concurrence, determined should be leg-
islatively imposed upon schools.` Rather than enabling school
officials to "figuratively shrug and say 'the problem did not originate
with us, so we are not responsible'" under § 10(j), this statutory ex-
ception would obligate schools to "take reasonable measures to pro-
tect children when they have advance notice of danger," as Justice Ire-
land suggested.489
Over the past twenty years, the Legislature has paid careful atten-
tion to the Supreme Judicial Court's pronouncements regarding pub-
lic tort liability: after Whitney, the Legislature responded to the court's
prospective abrogation of sovereign immunity by enacting the MTCA,
and after Jean W, the Legislature responded to the court's prospective
abrogation of the public duty rule by enacting § 10(j). 490 Now, in
Brum II, the court has spoken again, voicing its dissatisfaction with
§ 10(j) 's insulation of public schools. 491 In the Words of Bruin Il s ma-
had made inappropriate conunents during class—"was plainly insufficient to alert the
principal to the possibility that [the teacher] was involved in a sexual relationship with a
student." See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290; see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629 (1999) (holding that private damages action may lie against recipient of federal edu-
cation funds in cases of student-on-student sexual harassment under Title IX, where school
officials are deliberately indifferent to known acts of harassment in school programs or
activities, and where harassment is so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it
effectively bars victim's access to educational opportunity or benefit).
488 See id. at 290.
488
 See id. at 290-93.
487 See Brun, 704 N.E.2d at 1162 n.17. If the Legislature determined that the applica-
tion of this exception to all public contexts would expose public employers to potentially
crippling financial liability. the Legislature could limit the § 10(j) (5) exception to the
"special category of case[s]" involving violence in schools. See id.
488 See id. at 1162-63 (Ireland, J., concurring).
489
 See id. at 1163.
490 See supra notes 29-38, 156 and accompanying text.
491 See Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1162 n.17 & 1162-63 (Ireland. J., concurring).
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jority, the obligation to "achieve a satisfactory result in this special
category of case" is "a task for the Legislature," and in the words of
Justice Ireland, "Nhis entire matter is within the control of the Legis-
lature."492
 The court, the commonwealth and its municipalities, par-
ents, teachers and students alike are waiting.
As a policy matter, such an exception would not unduly burden
the court's threshold inquiry into public duty immunity because it
would admittedly apply in only a small number of cases in which there
are grave concerns over whether or not the school positively knew of
the risk of harm and tried to do anything about it.493
 In most cases,
school officials will either be unaware of the risk that comes to pass
until the harm is done, in which case the plaintiff will be unable to
prevail under the actual notice prong, or school officials will make
some sort of attempt to prevent the harm, in which case the plaintiff
will be unable to show deliberate indifference. 494
 In addition, the ex-
ception will not bankrupt local governments in favor of injured par-
ties because, as mentioned above, the exception will not likely apply
in the majority of cases. 495
 Moreover, even where there are reasonable
questions pertaining to school officials' actual notice and deliberate
indifference, the plaintiff bears the heavy burden of proving both
prongs of the exception, which means showing not that the official
should have known of the risk of harm, but rather, that the official did
know of the risk and officially refused to attempt to remedy it.496 Fur-
thermore, even if the plaintiff prevailed on both prongs, the claim
may still be barred under § 10(b) immunity, and if not, the municipal-
ity stands to lose no more than $100,000—the damage cap set by the
MTCA.497
In addition, the new exception will provide consistent and pre-
dictable results because it is based upon a careful and well-reasoned
two-prong analysis, and renders unnecessary courts' attempts to cir-
cumvent § 10(j) in creative and confusing ways on public policy
grounds, as the appeals court did in Brurn L498 Additionally, the new
exception will advance public policy by providing an incentive for
school officials to err on the side of affirmative action when they be-
492 Id. at 1162 n.17 & 1163.
493 See supra notes 481-83 and accompanying text.
494 See supra notes 481-83 and accompanying text.
495 See supra notes 481-83 and accompanying text.
496 See supra notes 481-83 and accompanying text.
497 See supra notes 42,46-49 and accompanying text.
498
 See Brum, 690 N.E.2d at 850-51; see also supra notes 481-83 and accompanying text.
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come aware of risks of harm, thus resulting in greater safety for school
students as well as greater accountability for the failure to act in spite
of knowledge of such risk.s. 499 Finally, the new exception will help to
ease a fundamental inconsistency between federal and state law: un-
der Title LX, a student who is sexually harassed in school may recover
damages from the school, while under state tort law, the family of a
child murdered in school receives nothing. 500 With the passage of
such an exception, school officials would become liable for displaying
deliberate indifference to a risk of harm of which they have notice;
indeed, school officials would become liable for failing to take any
action after reading the sign on the grenade and for failing to do any-
thing to deter the known and imminent threat of three armed in-
truders.501
This exception embodies the hope that when school officials are
aware of a risk of harm to students, they will take action.w 2 In light of
the young man slain in his high school social studies classroom on
April 12, 1993, and in light of increasing numbers of students at-
tacked and injured in schools in recent years, this does not seem like
too much to ask.5°5
CONCLUSION
Since 1978, Massachusetts public duty jurisprudence has been
engaged in a balancing of competing social values: "the compensation
of injured individuals and the protection of government from
financial burdens that threaten its ability to function." Throughout
the years, .this balancing has been performed by the Massachusetts
courts in concert with the Legislature, who have created and limited
09 See supra notes 481-83 and accompanying text.
54" See Gebsen 524 U.S. at 292-93; Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1155; see also supra notes 481-483
and accompanying text.
5°1 See supra notes 481-83 and accompanying text.
502 See supra notes 481-83 and accompanying text.
5°3 Shortly after Robinson's death, the Dartmouth School Committee established a Se-
curity Evaluation Committee to evaluate security at the Dartmouth High School. As a re-
sult of the Committee's recommendations, ilk September 1993, the Dartmouth High
School took the following steps to improve security: (1) two full-time security monitors
were hired; (2) all doors are locked; (3) visitors are viewed by way of a closed-circuit secu-
rity camera and are admitted through a door-buzzer system; (4) security monitors and
administrators carry walkie-talkies; and (5) photographic identification cards are issued to
all students. See Brief/Appendix for Appellant at 21a-23a, Blum (No. 96-P-687). In addition
to the security measures taken in response to the tragedy, a plaque in memorial to Jason
Robinson hangs in the hallway of the Dartmouth High School, a short distance from the
classroom in•which he was attacked.
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the laws enabling public employers both to be sued and to be pro-
tected from suit. More importantly, however, this balancing has been
informed by the issues raised and the concerns faced by the citizens
of Massachusetts, whether they be a sight-impaired child permanently
blinded by a defective door at school, or a women sexually assaulted
in her home by a parolee.
Today, in the wake of Brunt II, the Massachusetts citizenry has a
new voice. It is the voice of parents and of children, of teachers and of
school administrators, and of federal and state government officials,
who fear the tragic balance newly struck by the court in its decision to
immunize a school for the stabbing death of its student, despite the
school's notice of the risk of attack and its deliberate indifference to-
ward the attackers. The court has spoken, but the people wait. Now it
is the Legislature's turn to work a new balance between private com-
pensation and public immunity, between the protection of govern-
ment and the protection of a sixteen-year old high school student
stabbed to death in his social studies classroom. It is the Legislature's
turn to cast their eyes and ears upon the people of Massachusetts—to
see an injustice that may be averted and to hear stories of violence
tinged with hope for change.
There can be no doubting that Brum II was correctly decided un-
der the law, nor can there can be any doubt that the law is wrong. Le-
gal accountability must exist for the failure of school officials to pro-
tect students when they have actual notice of the risk of harm and yet
demonstrate deliberate indifference toward that risk. There must be
change. But change in the law that accounts for unforeseen circum-
stances, that balances compensation and public immunity in light of
evolving social values, must not come in the form of tortured judicial
analyses that twist and turn the law to make it fit a particular circum-
stance. The appeals court tried to effect such change in Brum I and
succeeded only in further confusing an already ambiguous provision.
Brum II, of course, did not change anything with regard to this bal-
ance. In fact, the Supreme Judicial Court's oversimplification of the
law swung the pendulum in the other direction, far away from com-
pensation of potential victims; so long as the conduct of a public em-
ployee can be manipulated into a failure to act to prevent harm, the
court will dismiss the case. Thus, the interpretive quagmire remains.
In order for change in the balancing of social values to be lasting
and meaningful, that change must be tempered by the policy of pre-
dictability. This requires both an accurate and consistent reading of
§ 10(j) by the courts in harmony with the three-step analysis, as well as
the formulation of a clearly and narrowly defined exception to § 10(j)
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by the Legislature, based upon principles of actual notice and delib-
erate indifference. These proposals are lofty and the stakes are high,
but needed change demands carefully chosen and effective means.
Indeed, Brum I and Brum II make clear that a faulty vessel in harsh
seas will never reach its destination, nor will a vessel that remains
tethered to its mooring. This Article's proposals, however, chart a
middle course. The Legislature's allowance  for an exception to
§ 10(j) will better equip the provision to deal with special categories
of cases, while the court's consistent and correct interpretation of
§ 10(j) will calm the seas of confusion surrounding public duty juris-
prudence. Together, the Legislature and the court may smooth the
passage to a change in the balance of competing social values, favor-
ing compensation in special circumstances. This is important because
in some cases, public employers should be held liable; indeed, the
lives of students and the peace of their families may well depend on it.
KEVIN M. BARRY*
* The author of this Article was a senior at the Dartmouth High School in April, 1993,
at the time of Robinson's death.
